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CHAPTER X, CHAPTER XI AND PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
MICHAEL E. Hoar°N*
Chapters X' and X1 2
 of the Bankruptcy Act!' seek to effectuate
the rehabilitation of corporate debtors .' by means of a unique collab-
oration between the federal district court and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC or Commission). 5
 Chapter X reorganiza-
tions involve "the judicial process whereby both unsecured and se-
cured debt, as well as the interests of stockholders, may be adjusted,
modified or otherwise dealt with," In contrast, Chapter X1 arrange-
ments comprise simpler, more expedited procedures for the settle-
* B.B.A., University of Iowa, 1972; J.D., University of San Diego, 1975; L.L.M.,
New York University, 1976; Associate, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Va.
' Bankruptcy Act, g§ 101-276, 1 I U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970).
§§ 301-399, I 1 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1970).
3 I I	 §§ 1-1255 (1970).
4 6 Comm•:it ON 11,\NKRupTcy,	 1 0.09 at 99 (14th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
C01.1.11:8]; 8 CoLim,	 1 2.09 at 82-84. Petitions proposing an arrangement under
Chapter XI may also be filed by an individual. Id. at 84.
5 See 2 L. Loss, SEcuitrriEs REGHLATioN 754-55 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Loss]. An extensive report issued by the SEC was an important factor prompting the
enactment of the Chandler Act, SEcuHrriLs AND EXCHANGE:COMMISSION, REPoRT oN THE
STUDY AND INVESTIGATtoN or THE WORK. ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL. AND FUNCTIONS OF
PROTECTIVE AND RE0RGANi7.ATION Comstri -rus, Parts 1-V11 (1939-40) [hereinafter cited
as SEC PRoTECTIvE COMMITITE STUDY], See REPORT Of."[IIE SECURITEES AND EXCHANGE
CoM1iNlissION ON PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY Er.c.tsLATION (S. 235 & S. 236), submitted to
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
December 8, 1975, at 3 [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT oN PRoPoSED LEGISLATION];
Comment, The Issuance qf Securities in Reorganizations and Arrangements under the Bank-
ruptcy Act and the Proposed Bankruptcy Ad, 36 ()Filo Si'. L.J. 380, 385 (1975). At least one
commentator has suggested that so many of the prnposals advanced by the Commission
were incorporated into the Chandler Amendments that Chapter X can he described as
largely the work of the SEC. See Rostow & Cutler, Competing Systems of Reorganizations:
Chapters X and XI y.
 Me Bankruptcy Ad, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1335 (1939).
6 6 CowER,supra note 4,
	 10.09 at 99-100 (footnote omitted).
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meet, satisfaction or extension of unsecured debts.' In each case,
however, the statute contemplates procedures, short of bankruptcy,
which conserve the going-concern values of the debtor's property and
avoid foreclosures and forced sales. 8 Far from liquidating the busi-
ness, Chapters X and XI are designed to facilitate its continued opera-
tion, while at the same time affording full consideration to the claims
of stockholders and creditors))
Because Chapters X and XI contemplate the continued opera-
tion of the debtor corporation, reorganization proceedings are only
"incidentally" law suits." Instead, the rehabilitation of the debtor pre-
sents "an administrative problem in the solution of which the public,
as well as the litigants, have an interest."" A corporate reorganization,
therefore, is "primarily an exercise in corporate finance and
management," 2 which necessitates a searching inquiry into broad
economic and business issues, including
general economic factors, competitive conditions in the in-
dustry, its trend of demand, ... its price policies, ... the
quality of the debtor's management[,] ... earnings in the
past, ... prediction of future earnings, and ... a determi-
nation of what would constitute a sound capitalization and
financial structure.' 3
To resolve this fundamentally "administrative" problem, the
Bankruptcy Act envisions repeated resort, by the court and other par-
ties in interest, to the expertise of the Securities and Exchange
Commission." Ultimate authority rests with the bankruptcy court
7 Bankruptcy Act, § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970). See 8 COWER, supra note
4, 1 2.07[3] at 77.
" 6 Couna,supra note 4,	 1 0.11 at 116-17. Thus, the corporate debtor is only
liquidated through ordinary bankruptcy proceedings in the event of the failure of the
reorganization or arrangement. See Bankruptcy Act, §§ 327, 376, 377, 386(1), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 727, 776, 777, 786(1) (1970) (Chapter XI cases); Bankruptcy Act, § 238, II U.S.C. §
638 (1970) (Chapter X).
9 6 Cota.IER, .supra note 4, 4 0.11 at 116-17. The SEC seeks to protect not only
those investors holding securities in corporations reorganized under the Act, but also
those offered securities issued in the course of the reorganization proceedings. SEC
REPolur ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION, supra note 5, at 4. Similarly, in its advisory role, the
Commission looks beyond the particular plan proposed to assist the court in effectuat-
ing "uniform principles and practices." Id.
" SEC PalarEcrivE COM NI	 STUDY, sUpra note 5, at 898-902 (part 1, 1937).
" Frank, Epithetical jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 317,
321-22 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Frank].
" SEC PROTEGM VE COMMITTEE STUDY.sttpra note 5, at 1 (part VIII, 1937).
"Id. at 1-2,
" Resort to administrative expertise in judicial reorganizations did not commence
with the enactment of Chapters X and XI. See Frank supra note 11, at 322-23 (discus-
sing function of Interstate Commerce Commission in railroad reorganizations and re-
sponsiblities of SEC in reorganization of any registered public utility holding company).
Both Chapters expressly provide for SEC intervention. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 208, 328, 11
U.S.C. §§ 608, 728 (1970). See text at notes 24-33 & 154, 159.70 infra.
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which, under the statute, may exercise extensive powers,'• including
the authority to approve and confirm the arrangement or plan of
reorganization.'" The Commission's role, on the other hand, resem-
bles that of an arnicus curiae." Its function is advisory, rather than
adjudicative, and thus differs radically from that under those statutes
which it administers.'" It neither initiates the proceedings, nor holds
hearings on the plan and entertains no authority to decide the issues
presented." Instead, the SEC's chief function is to act as an impartial
representative of public investors and to provide expert assistance to
the court. 2 °
This article seeks to assess the character of the SEC's role in both
Chapters X and XI. The isolation of the issues which have caused the
SEC particular concern, as well as the exploration of the positions it is
likely to take, should enable the parties to anticipate problems arising
in the course of a corporate reorganization which are likely to trigger
SEC intervention. This sensitivity to the prospect of SEC intervention,
in turn may permit the parties, through advance planning, to resolve
issues in a manner which will forestall such intervention and thereby
expedite the debtor's rehabilitation. Furthermore, the evaluation of
the SEC's participation will provide the necessary conceptual
framework for a critique of pending legislation which proposes sub-
15 6 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1 0.09 at 100. E.g., Chapter X: To issue stays and
injunctions, Bankruptcy Au, §$ 113, 116(4), 148, 11 U.S.C. §§ 513, 516(4), 548 (1970);
to issue extraterritorial process, id., 2a, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1970); to appoint a receiver
prior to the approval of the petition, id., § 112, 11 U.S.C. § 512 (1970) (by virtue of id.,
2a(3), 11 U.S.C. § I la(3) (1970) ); to exercise the jurisdiction of a court of equity, id.,
§ 1 l5, t l U.S.C. § 515 (1970); to permit the rejection of executory contracts and leases,
§ 116(1), 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1970); to authorize the lease or sale of any part of the
debtor's property, id., § 116(3), 11 U.S.C. § 516(3) (1970); to provide for the mandatory
preparation of schedules and lists of the dehtor's creditors and stockholders, id., §§
163-166, 11 U.S.C. §§ 563.66 (1970).
§§ 221, 361 11 U.S.C. $1, 621, 761 (1970).
" 6	 supra note 4, 1 0.09 at 105. See Herzog, Reorganizations and Ar-
raugments under Chapters X and XI: Problems of Administration From the Standpoint of the
Court, 35 REY. J. 113, 116 (1961).
18 38 SEC ANN. REP. 113 (1972). The federal securities laws authorize the SEC to
hold hearings, to issue rules and to impose remedial administrative sanctions. See, e.g., §
19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1970) (administrative sanc-
tions with respect to exchanges and securities); id., § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1970) (sub-
poena power in conducting investigations of alleged violations); id., § 22, 15 U.S.C.
78v (1970) (hearings); id., § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1970) (power to make rules and regu-
lations).
15 38 SEC ANN. REP. 113 (1972).
'I' To fulfill its advisory role in Chapter X and XI cases, the SEC maintains a spe-
cial Corporate Reorganization Division, staffed with attorneys and financial analysts,
based in Washington and four of its regional offices. From 1938-1975, the SEC partici-
pated in 603 Chapter X proceedings, involving aggregate liabilities of approximately
$5.5 billion, SEC REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION, supra note 5, at 4. This work is ac-
complished at "comparatively modest cost." Id. In 1975, for example, combined salaries,
travel and other expenses totalled $827,027 for staffing computed as equalling 35.1
man years. Id.
429
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stantial alterations of the Commission's current role in business reor-
ganization proceedings.
1. CHAPTER X REORGANIZATIONS
A. Notice to the SEC and its Decision to Intervene
Chapter X reorganizations are initiated by the filing of a
petition 2 ' which must be approved by the court. 22
 Copies of the origi-
nal petition, as well as all notices subsequently mailed to creditors,
must be sent to the SEC. 23
 This information enables the SEC to
monitor all developments affecting the rights of public stockholders
and creditors and to decide whether or not to intervene in the case."
In order to conserve its financial and human resources, the SEC re-
stricts its discretionary involvement to proceedings which affect sub-
stantial public investor interest. 25
 Accordingly, it is less likely to par-
ticipate in a case involving only trade or bank creditors, and is more
inclined to intervene where "an unfair plan has been or is about to be
proposed, public security holders are not represented adequately, the
reorganization proceedings are being conducted in violation of impor-
tant provisions of the Act, [or] the facts indicate that the Commission
can perform a useful service ... . "26
 Even where the Commission does
not intervene on its own motion, the court may request it to make an
appearance. 27
Once the Commission intervenes in a case, it becomes a "party in
interest, with the right to be heard on all matters arising in such pro-
ceeding ...."22
 As a party in interest, the Commission is represented
at all hearings and it files legal memoranda to support its position on
" A voluntary petition may be filed by the debtor. Bankruptcy Act, § 126, 11
U.S.C. § 526 (1970). An involuntary petition may be filed either by three or more cred-
itors holding certain specified claims or by an indenture trustee. Id.
2 ' The court will dismiss the petition unless it is satisfied that it has been filed in
good faith and complies with the statutory requirements. Id., § 141, 11 U.S.C. § 541
(1970). All petitions are required to include certain information. Id., § 130, 11 U.S.C. §
530 (1970). Additional information must be included in petitions filed by creditors or
indenture trustees. Id., § 131, 11 U.S.C. § 531 (1970).
23
 Bankruptcy Act, § 265(a), II U.S.C. § 665(a) (1970). Other specific sections
which require notice to the Commission, whether or not it decides to file an appear-
ance, include: id., § 161, 11 U.S.C. § 561 (1970) (hearing on the approval of the peti-
tion); id., § 167(5), I I U.S.C. § 567(5) (1970) (report of trustee's investigation of the
debtor); id., § 171, II U.S.C. § 571 (1970) (hearing on the plan); id., § 229(b), 11 U.S.C.
§ 629(h) (1970) (application for an order declaring consummation of the plan); id., §
247, 11 U.S.C. § 647 (1970) (hearing on application for allowances).
' 4 /d., § 208, I I U.S.C. § 608 (1970). The Commission's requests to participate
"have been granted almost without exception." 2 Loss,supra note 5, at 757.
23
 40 SEC ANN. REP. 123 (1974).
26 Id.
27
 Bankruptcy Act, § 208, I l U.S.C. § 608 (1970). ("The Securities and Exchange
Commission shall, if requested by the judge, and may, upon its own motion if approved
by the judge, file a notice of its appearance in a proceeding under this chapter.")
2" Bankruptcy Act, § 208, 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1970).
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various issues which arise in the proceeding. In addition, the SEC par-
ticipates regularly in informal conferences and discussions with the
parties. The Commission views its informal participation as having at
least equal importance as its more formal appearances in fulfilling its
function of protecting public investors." The only limitations on the
Commission's status as a party in interest are that it has no right to
appeal" and no right to claim compensation from the debtor's
estate." Denial of appellate standing, however, does not prevent the
Commission from joining, as a party or amicus curiae, in appeals filed
by other participants in the proceedings." In addition, the SEC may
also seek mandamus in order to vindicate its position in appropriate
cases." Section 208, therefore, gives the SEC "participation rights
similar to those of other parties in a chapter X proceeding" 39
 except
insofar as it denies the Commission the right to appeal.
B. Administration of the Debtor's Estate
After the court has approved the petition, 35
 the judge will ap-
point a "disinterested" trustee if the corporation's indebtedness ex-
ceeds a specified amount;" otherwise, the debtor may continue in
possession." Both the trustee and the debtor in possession are court
officers" who have primary responsibility for administering the
2" 10 SEC ANN. REP. 144 (1944).
3" Bankruptcy Act, § 208, 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1970). See Windle, The Securities and
Exchange Commission and Corporate Reorganizations under Chapter X, 34 REF, J. 37 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Windlet There is no legislative history explaining the congres-
sional intent in preventing the SEC from initiating an appeal. SEC REPORT ON PROPOSED
LEGISLATION. ,cuprra note 5, at 13. The Commission, however, speculates that Congress
felt that a government agency should not be allowed to delay the proceeding by taking
an appeal when none of the parties with an economic interest in the court's order had
chosen to do so. Id. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that affording the Commission
a right to appeal would increase its effectiveness. Windle, supra at 43.
Bankruptcy Act, § '242, 11 U.S.C. § 642 (1970),
" See, e.g„ In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 432 F.2d 232, 234 (3d Cir. 1970); In
re American Nat'l Trust, 426 F.2d 1059, 1066 (7th Cir. 1970); Ashbach v. Kirtley, 289
F.2d 159, 162 (8th Cir. 1961); 2 Loss.supra note 5, at 756.
SEC v. Krentzman, 397 F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir. 1968). The Commission had been
denied the right to cross examine witnesses and offer evidence by the district court. In
granting the SEC's requested writ, the court of appeals noted that in the context of a
denial of the Commission's right to participate effectively in the proceedings: "The ab-
sence of review at the behest of the Commission makes all the more appropriate a writ
to enable it to perform its task." Id. But we SEC v. Templar, 405 F.2d 126, 128 (10th
Cir. 1969) (denying writ of mandamus sought by SEC where none of the stockholders
whom the SEC sought to protect had raised timely claims).
" SEC v. Templar, 405 F.2d 126, 128 (10th Cir. 1969) (footnote omitted).
39 See note 22 supra.
" Bankruptcy Act, § 156, 11 U.S,C, § 556 (1970) (appointment of a trustee is
mandatory when "the indebtedness of a debtor, liquidated as to amount and nut con-
tingent as to liability, is $250,000 or over ....")
33 1d.
3" Bankruptcy Act, §§ 186-89, 11 U.S.C. §§ 586-89 (1970).
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debtor's estate 3" and for formulating the plan of reoganization for
submission to the court. 4" As court officers, their titles, rights and
powers derive from the extensive authority enjoyed by the court in
the administration of the debtor's estate during the reorganization
proceedings. The court, for example, exercises plenary jurisdiction
over actions brought by the trustee or debtor in possession against
"third persons on claims belonging to the estate.'" Furthermore, as a
court of equity, it has summary jurisdiction to protect the res within its
control." Accordingly, the statute specifically confers upon the court
the authority to enjoin or stay suits," to permit the trustee to reject
executory contracts of the debtor," to authorize him to issue certifi-
cates of indebtedness'" and to lease or sell any of the debtor's
property." With respect to these administrative matters, the SEC's
participation in theproceedings has tended to focus on three central
concerns: the qualification and performance of fiduciaries, the juris-
diction of the court to take certain actions, and the sale of substantial
assets of the debtor.
1. Scrutiny of the QUalification and Performance of Fiduciaries.
The Commission is particularly active in scrutinizing the qualifi-
31 Id.,	 189, 11 U.S.C. § 589 (1970).
Because a debtor continued in possession "shall have all the title, be vested with
all the rights, be subject to all the duties, and exercise all the powers of a trustee ap-
pointed under this chapter," Bankruptcy Act, 188, I 1 U.S.C. § 588 (1970), the SEC's
role, whether or not the debtor continues in possession, is substantially the same. One
distinction, however, is that the continuation of the debtor in possession obviates the
need to scrutinize the "disinterested" status of a trustee who otherwise might have been
appointed. Nevertheless, it would authorize the SEC to object to the retention of the
debtor in possession upon the ground that he is not qualified or is not disinterested. Id.,
§ 162, 11 U.S.C. § 562 (1970). A second distinction stems from the fact that the reten-
tion of the debtor in possession indicates that the debtor's liabilities are less extensive
such that the Commission, as a practical matter, may be less likely to exercise its dis-
cretionary power to intervene because the public holdings are not as large. See text
infra at notes 47-53. The marked contrast in the procedures of Chapter X and Chapter
XI ensures that the Commission's role in a Chapter X case in which the debtor con-
tinues in possession is not simply analogous to its participation in a Chapter X case
where the debtor generally remains in possession. See note 147 infra. For a discussion
of the contrast between Chapters X and XI, see text & notes infra at 143-58 and at
173-77. Thus, it is the character of the proceedings, rather than the simple fact that the
debtor continues in possession, which governs the nature of the Commission's role.
"Bankruptcy Act, 11 167, 169, 11 U.S.C. §§ 567, 569 (1970). 11, however, the
debtor is continued in possession, the plan may be filed by the debtor, by any creditor
or indenture trustee. by a stockholder, if the debtor is not insolvent, or by an examiner
appointed by the judge. Id., § 170, 11 U.S.C. 570 (1970).
"See Bankruptcy Act, §§ 2a(6), 2a(7), 102, 11 U.S.C. §§ I la(6), 11x(7), 502
(1970); 6 CoittEtt.stipra note 4, 1 3.18 at 537.
12 Bankruptcy Act, § 114, 11 U.S.C. § 514 (1970).
"Id., 116(4), II U.S.C. § 516(4) (1970). See 6 ComER.supra note 4,	 1 3.05 at
429-30.
" Bankruptcy Act, 1 116(1), 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1970).
43 Id.,	 116(2), II U.S.C. 1 516(2) (1970).
"Id., § 116(3), 11 U.S.C. 1 516(3) (1970).
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cations of persons assuming fiduciary obligations under Chapter X.
The statute, for example, specifically requires that the trustee" and
the attorney appointed to represent him shall be "disinterested" 4 " and
defines the circumstances in which a person shall not he deemed to
meet the statutory standard. 4 " These provisions are designed to en-
sure that the court's appointees be "free of connections not only with
the old management but with all of its associates" in order to effec-
tuate the ultimate purpose of securing "independent and faithful ad-
ministration of distressed properties." 5" Therefore, when confronted
with evidence of even a possible conflict of interest,''' the Commission
will urge that the fiduciary voluntarily resign. 52
 If the fiduciary re-
fuses to resign, the SEC may file a formal objection to his appoint-
ment thus requiring the court to rule on his qualification. 5" In Calvin
Christan Retirement Home, Inc. v. Paire, Inc.," for example, the SEC
petitioned for a disqualification of the attorney appointed as general
counsel for the trustee on the ground that he was not disinterested
since he concurrently represented the creditors who had petitioned
for an involuntary reorganization of the debtor. 55 The Commission,
then, generally seeks to ensure that persons employed as trustees and
attorneys in the course of Chapter X proceedings meet the statutory
standard of "disinterest" which was considered one of the central aims
of that chapter."
" Id.,	 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970).
"Id., § 157, 11 U.S.C. * 557 (1970).
Chapter X specifies the standards of disinterestedness which apply to the trus-
tee and his attorney. 14., § 158, 11 U.S.C. * 558 (1970). In addition to proscribing the
appointment of persons standing in certain specified relationships to the debtor, such as
creditor, stockholder, underwriter of any of its outstanding securities, director, officer,
or employee, the section includes the flexible catchall disqualification for persons hav-
ing "for any reason an interest materially adverse to the interests of any class of' cred-
itors or stockholders," Id., subsection (4). Against these statutory tests, the personal in-
tegrity or ability of a person is•immaterial. 6 Cot.trmsupra note 4, 17.03 at 1163.
5° Teton, Reorganization Reviced, 48 YALE L.,1. 573, 574 (1939).
" The statutory tests of disinterestedness are strictly applied. See 6 Commt,supra
note 4, 1 7;03 at 1162-63; Windle, supra note 30, at 41.
"See, e.g., In re Congaree Iron & Steel Co. (D.S.C. No. 72-72) and In re Tilco,
Inc. (D. Kan., No. 23662), reported in 39 SEC ANN. REt'. 118 (1973).
53
 The court has the power ''at any time, without or upon cause shown" to re-
move trustees and appoint substitute trustees. Bankruptcy Act, § 160, 11 U.S.C. § 560
(1970). Hearings on objections to the retention of a trustee in office are mandatory. Id.,
§§ 160, 161, 11 U.S.C. §§ 560, 561 (1960).
54 (WA" Mich., Nos. 0-74-1113-B-1 & 0-74-1114-B-1), reported in 41 SEC ANN.
REP. 151 (1975).
53
 As a result of the Commission's petition, the order finding the attorney disin-
terested and appointing him as general counsel to the trustee was withdrawn. Thereaf-
ter; a new general counsel was appointed. Id. See Tilco, Inc., (D. Kan„ No. '23662),
reported in 39 SEC ANN. REt', 118 (1973). In Tilco, a lawyer, appointed by the court as
general counsel to the trustee, resigned when advised by the SEC that he was not disin-
terested because he had been associated with the law. firm which acted as counsel for
the debtor within two years preceding the filing of' the Chapter X petition. Id.
56
 The mandatory appointment of a disinterested trustee in certain cases has
been termed the "keystone" to the reforms effectuated by the Chandler Act. Teton,
933
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Just as the Commission seeks to oversee the disinterested charac-
ter of trustees and their attorneys, it also has been active in monitor-
ing the fiduciary status 57 of corporate officers and committees repre-
senting creditors or stockholders and will challenge their failure to
comply with the statutory authorization process. 5" The SEC will op-
pose efforts by unauthorized individuals to solicit funds from public
investors for the ostensible purpose of organizing and representing
protective committees. 5 " Similarly, the Commission will seek the dis-
qualification of committees subject to possible conflicts of interest. Ac-
cordingly, it may oppose committees seeking to represent different
classes of creditors or stockholders or committees composed of former
insiders who have been charged with mismanagement." When a
committee, however, is duly authorized under the statute, the Com-
mission will support it in its battle to retain representative status.B' In
Reorganization Revised, 48 YALE 1- J. 573, 574 (1939). Significantly, in its reports which
were an important factor prompting the enactment of the Chandler Act, the SEC de-
voted considerable attention to the problems created by the presence of conflicts of in-
terest in corporate reorganizations. See SEC PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE. STUDY„s- upra note
5, Part I, at 355-57; Part II, at 164-294.
" Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268 (1941) (recognizing
the fiduciary status of committees and others representing creditors and stockholders).
" Section 209 authorizes any creditor or stockholder to "act in person, by an at-
torney at law, or by a duly authorized agent or committee." Bankruptcy Act, § 209, 11
U.S.C. § 609 (1970). Section 211 requires each such representative committee to file
with the court a statement which includes a statement of the terms of its employment, a
copy of the instrument empowering them to act on behalf of creditors or stockholders
and a showing of the claims or stock represented by such committee. Id., § 211, 11
U.S.C. § 611 (1970). Sectioh 210, 11 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) requires an attorney for cred-
itors or stockholders to file a similar statement. The right of appearance of every per-
son or committee, representing more than twelve creditors, and every indenture trus-
tee, is conditioned on the filing of this statement. 6A CowEtt„supra note 4, 1 9.30 at
345. These committees and representatives are subject to the court's regulation and
control. Bankruptcy Act, § 212, 11 U.S.C. § 612 (1970). Furthermore, committees pur-
porting to represent creditors or stockholders may not be heard in the proceedings
until they have complied with all other applicable laws, including the federal securities
laws. Id., § 213, I1 U.S.C. § 613 (1970); In re First Home Investment Corp., 368 F.
Supp. 597, 602 (D. Kan. 1973).
"In re First Home Investment Corp., 368 F. Supp. 597, 599 (D. Kan. 1973), In
that case, the Commission obtained a'court order enjoining a former officer and direc-
tor of the debtor from further solicitations for representative status. Furthermore, the
SEC also moved the court to order the former officer to account for all receipts and
disbursements. Id. at 603. Once the accounting was filed the Commission promptly ob-
jected to it and requested disallowance of all claimed expenses. 40 SEC ANN. REP. 125
(1974). See also Imperial-American Resources Fund, Inc., (D. Colo., No. 72-B-556),
reported in 39 SEC ANN. REP. 119 (1973), where the district court, on application of the
Commission, ordered an individual to cease soliciting funds and representative author-
ity from certain limited partnerships in which the debtor was a general partner because
he had not complied with the applicable provisions of Chapter X.
"" Windle, supra note 30, at 42.
"Cf. American Nat'l `Trust v. Shanklin, 420 F,2(1 1117, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 (1971), releg denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971), where the court af-
firmed a district court order dismissing a motion by a certificate holder of the debtor
trusts to vacate the orders approving the reorganization petitions filed by other certifi-
cate holders. The motion had questioned the standing of the certificate holders. How-
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Protective Committee v. Kirkland, 62
 for example, the SEC supported the
common stockholder committee's appeal of a lower court order re-
quiring the committee to file new authorizations from the stockhold-
ers. Ruling in its favor, the Fifth Circuit stated that it was "unwilling
to see the role of the Committee downgraded or impeded by the
court's order and agree[d] with the SEC that the order [was] without
adequate justification." 3
 Thus, the SEC will oversee the fiduciary
status of committees, and may either challenge their failure to observe
the statutory authorization process, or may support their compliance
therewith, whether on its own motion or on motions brought by other
parties in interest.
Once it has scrutinized the qualification of fiduciaries, the SEC
also may assist them in the performance of their duties. In particular,
the Commission staff regularly aids the trustee both in his investiga-
tion of the debtor and in his compliance with statutory reporting
requirements." This accounting of corporate affairs is one of the
trustee's primary ditties in Chapter X proceedings and it stems from
two distinct but overlapping sources. Section 167(1), as augmented by
section 167(3), requires the trustee, when so directed by the court, to
report to the judge on the "acts, conduct, property, liabilities, and fi-
nancial condition of the debtor,"" 5
 as well as to communicate "any
facts ... pertaining to fraud, misconduct, mismanagement and ir-
regularities, and to any causes of action available to the estate." 6 " The
assistance rendered by the SEC in the course of this investigation
takes many forms. initially, it may urge the court to direct the trustee
to conduct the investigation once the reorganization court has taken
jurisdiction." Thereafter the Commission's investigation may disclose
misconduct by persons connected with the debtor which otherwise
might not have been uncovered. 68
 In addition to uncovering such
ever, the court held that the orders approving the petitions had become final and that
objections should have been raised at the hearing at which the court first approved the
petition.
"2 481 F.2d 606, 607 (5th Cii.. 1973) (per curiarn).
" Id. at 607.
" 38 SEC ANN. Rd.. 118 (1972).
65
 Bankruptcy Ad, § 167(I), 11 U.S,C. § 567(1) (1970).
" Id., § 167(3), 1 I U.S.C. § 567(3) (1970).
67
 See In re Federal Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (S.D. W. Va. 1971).
"" See Windle, supra note 30, at 38. The Commission may participate in the ex-
amination of witnesses. See In re Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 408 F.2d 640, 641 (3d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969). The SEC is most active in cases present-
ing alleged violations of the federal securities laws. See 40 SEC ANN, REP, 126-27 (1974).
An investigative report by the SEC may reveal the presence of insider trading upon
which the trustee can sue for a direct return of short-swing profits to the corporation.
In re R. Hoe & Co. (S.D.N.Y., No. 69-B-461, 1969), reported in 40 SEC ANN. REP. 126
(1974). An SEC-aided trustee's investigation may provide sufficient data for private
plaintiffs to bring either individual or class action suits against officers, directors or pro-
fessional advisors, such as accountants, fiat contravention of federal securities laws. In re
Dolly Madison Indus., Inc. (E.D. Pa. 19711), reported in 39 SEC ANN. REP, 126 (1973).
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causes of action, the SEC will notify the court of any failure on the
part of the trustee to pursue them. 69 Furthermore, once the trustee
takes action and begins to negotiate with the alleged malfeasants or to
compromise other claims, the Commission will scrutinize any pro-
posed settlement agreements especially where the alleged violations
involve the federal securities laws." Thus, the Commission may urge
the court confronted, with such a compromise agreement to "hold a
hearing so that evidence can be presented to permit a fair assessment
of the compromise.""i
Not only does the SEC assist the trustee in investigating the debt-
or pursuant to the request of the judge under section 167(1), but it
may also become involved in enforcing the requirement of section
167(5) that the trustee file reports on the continued management of
the debtor's estate." Unlike the investigation under section 167(1)
which is made only upon the order of the judge and which seeks in
particular to uncover fraud or misconduct in the debtor's affairs
which might give rise to claims against the estate, the periodic reports
made under section 167(5) are mandatory and their subject
matter—the financial condition of the debtor—is more restricted in
scope." Although the statute fails to specify an established form For
these reports, minimally they should contain "[a] periodic balance
sheet and profit-and-loss statement...; statements of bank deposits
...; [separate statements of] the financial condition of subsidiaries...;
and annual reports ....""
The SEC's involvement in the trustee's compliance with these in-
vestigation and reporting requirements imposed by the bankruptcy
laws is particularly appropriate in view of the fact that these require-
ments effectively parallel the investigation and reporting provisions of
the federal securities laws. The Securities Acts require the SEC to in-
a" Committee v, Kent, 143 F.2d 684, 686 (4th Cir. 1944) (per curiam).
7" See Arlan's Dept. Store, Inc., (S.D.N.Y., No. 73-B-468), reported in 41 SEC ANN.
REP. 153 (1975), where the court approved, over the objection of the SEC, a cash set-
tlement of a shareholder's derivative action against the debtor's management. Since the
trustee had not had the opportunity to conduct the required investigation, the Commis-
sion urged that the investigation be made so that the trustee could then present facts
from which an informed judgment Could be reached on the adequacy of the settlement
figure. The SEC had contended that the cash figure was not so significant in light of
the debtors' needs to warrant relinquishing possible claims. Id.
" 40 SEC ANN. REP. 127 (1974), citing In re R. Hoe & Co., Inc. (S.D.N.Y., No.
69-B-461, 1969). See also In re. Westec Corp. (S.D. Texas, No. 66-H-62, 1966) reported in
40 SEC ANN. REP, 126 (1974).
7z
	
Act, § 167(5), 1 I U.S.C. § 567 (5) (1970); Ch. X R. 10.208;
Corotto, SEC Reporting, Proxy and Antifraud Compliance—An Additional Perspective on Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization Proceedings, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1572 (1975) thereinafter cited as
Corotto]. The Bankruptcy Rules specifically provide that "Whe Securities and Exchange
Commission may recommend the form of such reports and summaries." Ch. X
R.10-208(c). Furthermore, copies of the trustee's report filed under § 167(5) must be
submitted to the SEC. Bankruptcy Act, § 167(5), 11 U.S.C. § 567(5) (1970).
" See 6 CowER,supra note 4, 1 7.22 at 123'3-34.
" Corotto, supra note 72, at 1572.
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vestigate any actual or threatened violations of their provisions." The
scope of such an investigation clearly overlaps with an investigation
conducted by the trustee under section 167(1) of the Bankruptcy Act
to the extent that both "contemplate to some extent, the devolution of
fraudulent practices by persons in control and operation of the debtor
corporation." 76
 Similarly, the registered reporting status of a corpo-
rate debtor" requires it to disclose information to the SEC 79
 which is
very similar in character to that which the trustee must submit to the
court under section 167(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. 79 As a result of this
overlap, the SEC may already have received or gathered much infor-
mation pertinent to a corporate reorganization and therefore may
readily assist the trustee or ensure his compliance with his statutory
duties under the Bankruptcy Act.
2. Activities on Behalf of the Jurisdiction of the Court.
In addition to the performance and qualification of fiduciaries, a
second major concern of the Commission's participation in Chapter X
proceedings has been to thwart attempts to interfere with the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the reorganization court. A reorganization court
has exclusive jurisdiction of the property of the debtor, wherever
located," and may enjoin or stay "the commencement or continuation
of a suit against a debtor."" Bankruptcy courts are "essentially courts
of equity" and have "the power to issue an injunction when necessary
to prevent the defeat or impairment of [their] jurisdiction." 92
 In rec-
75
 Securities Act of' 1933, § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(t) (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1970). The Commission would be derelict in
failing so to investigate, United States v. Parrott, 315 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (S.D.N,Y.
1969), offd, 425 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
7 " In re Commonwealth Fin, Corp., 288 F. Supp. 786, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1968), VW
per curiam, 408 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969) (footnote omit-
ted).
" Securities issued by the debtor corporation may have been registered under §
12(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(1)) (1970) (when
traded on a national securities exchange); under § 12(g) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970) (when ,engaged in interstate commerce or whose
securities are traded by means of the mails or by an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce and which has total assets exceeding $1,000,000); or may have been issued by a
registered offering under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970).
" Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 17m(a)
(1970).
The information required is that which ensures that previously filed registrar
dons are "reasonably current" and therefore includes transactions leading to changes in
the control of the registrant; acquisitions or dispositions of assets; legal actions; changes
in securities, or in amounts of securities outstanding; financial statements, etc. SEC
Form 8-1( in PRACTICING Lim I NSTITUTE, SECURITIES REGULATION SOURCEROOK 7-83
(R.L. Krauss ed. 1972-73). See generally Corotto, supra note 72, at 1571-76, 1605-08.
"" Bankruptcy Act, § Ill, 11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970).
"' Id., § 113, 11 U.S.C. § 513 (1970).
" 2 /n re Imperial "400" Nat'l Corp., 429 F.2d 680, 682 (3d Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), quoting Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Go. v. Chicago Rock Island & Pac.
Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 675 (1935).
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ognition of the increasingly liberal interpretations courts have given to
the scope of the reorganization court's authority,83 the SEC often will
appear in support of the court's jurisdiction to take whatever actions
are necessary to effectuate the rehabilitation of the debtor. Thus, in
In Re Imperial "400" National, Inc.," the Commission appeared in sup-
port of the lower court's order, affirmed on appeal, 85 which enjoined
further prosecution in another court of an ordinary bankruptcy pro-
ceeding involving a partnership in which the debtor corporation was a
partner." Similarly, in In re Traders Compress Co., 87 the SEC joined
with the trustees of a corporate propane gas distributor undergoing
reorganization in seeking an injunction restraining the gas supplier
from terminating its supply contract. 88 Notwithstanding that the sup-
ply agreement gave the supplier the right to terminate the contract,
the district court held that it had jurisdiction to issue a permanent in-
junction to delay the enforcement of the contract in order to effect
the reorganization of the distributor." The SEC, then, generally ap-
pears in order to uphold the jurisdiction of the court where necessary
to accomplish the debtor's reorganization. To the extent, however,
that the SEC considers that the court's exercise of that jurisdiction will
conflict with the ultimate purpose of corporate rehabilitation, it may
oppose the proposed action on the merits.
3. Lease or Sale of Substantial Assets of the Debtor.
One primary area of administration in which the SEC consis-
tently has opposed court-authorized proposed action on the merits in-
volves the lease or sale of the debtor's property. Section 116(3) ena-
bles the judge, upon the approval of a petition, to "authorize a re-
" See In re Internat'l Power Sec. Corp., 170 F.2d 399, 402 (3d Cir. 1948). See also
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago Rock Island & Pac. Ry., '294 U.S.
648, 675-76 (1935).
" 429 F.2(1 671 (3d Cir. 1970), noted in 36 SEC ANN. REP. 176-77 (1970).
" Id. at 679.
Appellants contended that the bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction over
the "property" of the debtor extends only to the kind of property for which title passes
to the trustee upon appointment. Id. at 678. Therefore, they concluded that the court
has no jurisdiction to enjoin the ordinary bankruptcy proceeding because the debtor,
holding only a 75% interest in the partnership, did not have such title to the assets of
the partnership. Id. The court, however, determined that the term "property" in § 111
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970), must be construed "mostgenerously"
and does not depend on traditional concepts. 429 F.2d at 678. Therefore, the court
concluded that the lower court had jurisdiction to enjoin the bankruptcy proceeding
where the partnership involved was an integral part of the debtor's business operation
whose liquidation clearly would affect the latter's reorganization. Id. at 677-79. See In re
Equity Funding Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1266, 1273-74 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (SEC supports pos-
ition of trustee who had filed application to enjoin prosecution of certain fraud claims
against subsidiaries of the debtor which had filed a petition for reorganization. The
court upheld its jurisdiction to issue the injunction).
87 381 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (mem.)
"Id. at 791.
"Id. at 793.
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ceiver or a trustee or a debtor in possession, upon such notice as the
judge may prescribe and upon cause shown, to lease or sell any prop-
erty of the debtor, whether real or personal, upon such terms and
conditions as the judge may approve.""" The complexities of corpo-
rate business have made the need to "prune a debtor's business" in
order to facilitate its reorganization an almost "routine aspect" of
Chapter X administration."' While the Commission recognizes the
need to avoid freezing the debtor in the same position which caused
its insolvency," 2 it nevertheless subjects sales of major assets of the
debtor, pursuant to section 116(3), to close scrutiny because these
sales may lead to the liquidation of the debtor without a vote by
security holders and may thereby reduce the plan of reorganization to
the ratification of a fait accompli." 3 Accordingly, the Commission has
adopted a presumption against proposed sales of all or a critical
portion of a debtor's assets under the summary procedure of section
116(3) and will support them only in "exceptional circumstances."" In
the absence of the requisite "exceptional circumstances," the
Commission's opposition to the sale may take various forms. It may
oppose the sale outright." 5 Alternatively, it may agree with the basic
decision to sell, but may predicate its support on the court's
disposition of secondary factors. For example, the SEC may take the
position that the offer being considered is inadequate." Similarly, it
"" 11 U.S.C.* 516(3) (1970).
" 1 39 SEC ANN. REP. 120 (1973). In addition to noting the "increasing complex-
ities" of corporations, the SEC expressly faulted "the hidiscriminate diversification
which may precede corporate fitilures ...."
92 id,
"3 See 39 SEC ANN. REP. 120 (1973); 38 SEC ANN. Rn'. 115-16 (1972). The sum-
mary procedure of § 116(3) should be contrasted with § 216(10), dealing with plans of
reorganization, which expressly allows the plan to provide for the sale of any or all of
the debtor's assets. 11 U.S.C.* 616(10) (1970). A sale pursuant to a plan of reorganiza-
tion under § 216(10) is not committed to the court's sole discretion, but requires com-
pliance with the statutory protective devices surrounding the adoption of the plan. A
sale in the latter case, therefore, must. he approved by a majority of creditors and stock-
holders who are the beneficial owners of the property in question. 39 SEC ANN'. REP.
120 (1973).
"39 SEC ANN. REP. 120 (1973); 38 SEC ANN. REP. 115-16 (1972). "Exceptional
circumstances" authorizing a sale, however, are nut limited to emergencies or situations
where there is imminent danger of loss to the corporation. In re Equity Funding Corp.,
492 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir.) (per curiatn), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 964 (1974). In that case,
the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order authorizing the debtor's trustee, as sole
stockholder of a wholly owned subsidiary of the debtor, to consent to a sale of assets of
subsidiary Id. The court determined that the trial court could properly have concluded
that there was "cause shown" for the approval of the sale on the basis of findings of
fact that the market value of the subsidiary was likely to decline substantially in the near
future. Id,
"In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 176 F.2d 493, 494 (3d Cir. 1949), affd in part, reed
part on other grounds, 190 F.2d 273 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 893 (1951); Bubble Up
Del., Inc. (C.D. Cal., Nos. 78641-FW, 78950-FW, 79596-FW, and 80470-FW), reported in
39 SEC ANN. Rn'. 121 (1973).
" In re Bermee Corp. (S.D.N.V. No. 71-B-291, 1971) reported in 39 SEC ANN.
REP. 121 (1973). Fur a case where the court scrutinized the adequacy of the considera-
don, see In re Penn Cent., i'ransp. Co., 356 F. Stipp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (meal,).
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may advocate that the court mandate a particular disposition of the
sale proceeds."' Furthermore, where different potential purchasers
submit bids, the Commission may recommend that the parties submit
proposed plans of sale to the trustee; so that the sale would be made
pursuant to a plan and therefore would require a vote of the security
holders affected by it. 98
 In effect, therefore, with respect to this aspect
of the administration of the debtor's estate, the Commission assumes
an overseer role whereby it seeks to avoid the expansion of a
fiduciary's authority in a manner which it views as potentially
conflicting with the very philosophy of reorganization.""
C. Plan of Reorganization
Although the SEC is actively concerned with the administration
of the debtor's estate, the statute, aside from the notice provisions,
only mandates its participation in conjunction with the formulation
and confirmation of a successful plan whose consummation is the
"focal point of the reorganization process.' ,100
 While the trustee has
the primary responsibility for the preparation of a plan,'" and the
judge has sole responsibility for its ultimate approval, 102 Chapter X
institutionalizes the potential for SEC participation at every step of the
process.' 03 The SEC's involvement will be most extensive in cases in
22 In In re Equity Funding Corp., fir example, the SEC's support of the trustee's
decision to sell the subsidiary was partially conditioned on the court's requiring the sale
proceeds to be deposited in an interest-bearing account from which no withdrawal
could be made without approval of the court after notice to interested parties. In re
Equity Funding Corp. (C.D. Cal., No. 73.03467, 1973), reported in 40 SEC ANN. REP. 125
(1974), affd, 492 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 964 (1974).
" Bubble Up Del., Inc. (C.D. Cal., Nos. 78641-FW, 78950-FW, 795960-FW and
80470-FW), reported in 38 SEC ANN. REP. 115 (1972).
"See 39 SEC ANN. REP. 120 (1973).
1 " Windle, supra note 30, at 39.
1 " Bankruptcy Act, §§ 167, 169, 11 U.S.C. §§ '567, 569 (1970). If, however, the
debtor is continued in possession, the plan may he filed by the debtor; by any creditor
or indenture trustee; by a stockholder, if the debtor is nut insolvent; or by an examiner
appointed by the judge. Id., § 170, 11 U.S.C. § 570 (1970).
102 6 COWER, supra note 4, 17.30 at 1263. The judge's approval of a plan is con-
ditioned on his finding that•the plan complies with § 216, I1 U.S.C. § 616 (1970), and
is "fair and equitable, and feasible." Bankruptcy Act, § 174, II U.S.C. § 574 (1970). Sec-
tion 221, l 1 U.S.C. § 621 (1970), governs the court's confirmation of a plan.
1 " After appointment of the trustee, the judge will fix a time for a hearing on
the plan. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 169, 170, II U.S.C. §§ 569, 570 (1970). Notice of the time
of this hearing must be given to the Commission. Id., § 171, 11 U.S.C. § 571 (1970).
After the hearing and before approval of the plan, the judge may submit the plan to the
SEC for report if' the scheduled indebtedness is less than $3,000,000, and must do so
where the scheduled indebtedness exceeds $3,000,000. Id., § 172, 11 U.S.C. § 572
(1970). The judge may not approve a plan submitted to the SEC until it has filed a re-
port. Id., § 173, 1 l U.S.C. § 573 (1970). After the judge approves the plan, the trustees
submit the plan, together with the Commission's report, to all creditors and stockhold-
ers affected by it. Id., § 1 75, 11 U.S.C. § 575 (1970). After the plan has been accepted
by a specified percentage of the debtor's creditors, the judge fixes a hearing for consid-
eration of the confirmation of the plan and must notify the SEC. Id., § 179, 11 U.S.C. §
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which it files a formal report on the plan. If the corporation's
scheduled indebtedness exceeds $3,000,000, the court must submit
the proposed plan to the Commission 'for an advisory report; the
judge may submit the plan to the SEC where the scheduled indebted-
ness is less than $3,000,000. 104 In such a situation, however, the
Commission is likely to file a formal advisory report "only in a case
which involves substantial public investor interest and presents sig-
nificant problems." 1 • This report, while merely advisory,' 06 often has
considerable influence on the eventual acceptance or rejection of a
plan." 7
Yet, even in cases where no formal report is filed, the SEC be-
comes involved as the court and other parties to the proceeding seek
to draw on its expertise. The person charged with responsibility for
preparing the plan may engage the Commission's assistance in its
formulation.'° 8 Similarly, the SEC will often advise the court of its
opinion by letter or may authorize its counsel to present its views
orally or in written memoranda.'"
In making either formal or informal reports on reorganization
plans, the Commission has given particular attention to the valuation
of the debtor's assets. Valuation is the starting point for the
determination of the fairness, equity and feasibility of any proposed
plan. In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, the Supreme Court
approved the capitalization of earnings valuation technique there
recommended by the SEC."° Although the SEC generally continues
to adhere to the capitalization of earnings approach, it may vary its
recommendations in particular cases."' Despite recent criticism of
579 (1970). .Similarly hearings on modifications of a plan also require notice to the
Commission, Id., § 222, I I U.S.C. § 622 (1970).
"4 Id., § 172, II U.S.C. §.572 (1970).
"'s 40 SEC ANN. REP. 127 (1974). The statute clearly contemplates that the SEC
may choose not to file a formal report, See Bankruptcy Act, § 173, 11 U.S.C. § 573
(1970). In practice, the Commission chooses to file such reports in only a small number
of cases. In the last five years, for example, it has prepared formal reports only in five
cases. 41 SEC ANN, Ru'. 153 (1975) (none); 40 SEC ANN. REP. 127 (1974) (2); 39 SEC
ANN. REP. 123 (1973) (none); 38 SEC ANN. Rat'. 120 (1972) (3); 37 SEC ANN. REP. 184
(1971) (none).
"'Bankruptcy Act, § 172, 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970).
1 °' When soliciting the acceptance of a plan on the part of the creditors, the trus-
tee must transmit to them a copy of the SEC's report. Id., § 175, 11 U.S.C. § 575
(1970). See 6 COLLIER,sapra note 4,17.30 at 1263.
"8 See 6 CouiEtt, supra note 4, 117.30 at 1264.
L"" 40 SEC ANN. REP. 127 (1974). See 2 Loss,supra note 5, at 756.
"" 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941). This technique is founded on "the premise that
'value' represents a capitalization of prospective earning power at an appropriate rate
which recognizes the risks inherent in the industry and in the particular enterprise."
Frank, Epithetical jurisprudence and The Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
the Administration if Chapter X 4#' the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U. L.Q. Ray. 316, 341 (1941)
[hereinafter cited as Frank).
1 " Thus, capitalization of estimated net operating profits may be approp-
riate in one case whereas in another case the proper method may he to
discount to present worth the net cash receipts over the life of the enter-
.
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valuation techniques urged by the SEC,'" its approach generally is
accorded substantial weight by the court." 3
Beyond providing input on the proper method for the valuation
of the debtor's assets, the SEC also attempts to ensure that the court
apply appropriate standards in determining the fairness and feasibility
of the proposed plan. For the purposes of assessing the fairness of a
plan, the Commission consistently has advocated the application of the
"absolute priority rule," 114
 which posits that a plan is not "fair and
equitable" "unless it provides participation for claims and interests in
complete recognition of their strict priorities, and unless the value of
the debtor's assets supports the extent of the participation afforded
each class of claims or interests included in the plan."" 5
 In evaluating
the feasibility of a plan, the Commission, therefore, will consider a
ti
number of different factors:
whether the total debt is reasonable when compared with
the capitalized valuation of the debtor, whether the
expected earning power will be sufficient to meet the fixed
charges, whether proposed dividends can be paid, whether
there are provisions for adequate working capital, the effect
of the new capitalization on prospective credit, the adequa-
cy of sinking fund provisions, and whether the proposed
capital structure is in conformity with sound business and
accounting practice." 6
The Commission's assessment of the feasibility of a proposed
plan is particularly significant because it is closely related to its duties
under the federal securities laws. Because the sale and distribution of
securities issued pursuant to a plan of reorganization is exemptm
from the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act
prise. If liquidation value exceeds going-concern value, the Commission
has not hesitated to recommend liquidation and the debtor's assets should
of course, he valued on a liquidation basis. In a case involving an invest-
ment company with readily marketable securities, the Commission valued
the assets by reference to market quotations rather than capitalization of
prospective earnings.
Windle, supra note 30, at 40 (citations omitted).
' 12 See generally Blum, Corporate Reorganization Doctrine as Recently Applied by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 96 (1972).
'" See Moulded Prods., Inc. v. Barry, 474 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir.) (stressing the
importance of this "going concern" valuation), cm. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
114
 The Court has characterized the "fair and equitable" standard as incorporat-
ing the absolute priority doctrine. Protective Cumin. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT
Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 441 (1968).
"5
 6 Cots.wit.supra note 4,1 11.06 at 613 (footnote omitted).
	 •
"16 1d., 111.07 at 639-40 (footnotes omitted). See In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, inc.,
374 F. Supp. 949, 956, 957.58 (D.N.J. 1974); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 273 F. Supp.
863, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"7
 Bankruptcy Act, § 264(a), 11 U.S.C. § 664(a) (1970). The exemption is lim-
ited, however, and it does not apply to transactions by an issuer or an underwriter in
connection with a distribution, otherwise than pursuant to a plan. Id., § 264(a)(2), 11
U.S.C. § 664(a)(2) (1970).
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of 1933, 1 " the Commission can safeguard the rights of both present
security holders and future security purchasers only by insisting on
strict compliance with the feasibility requirement which will help
prevent the circulation of unsound securities." 9
 Furthermore, these
provisions affording the reorganization court the technical facilities
and expert advisory assistance of the SEC are particularly critical
because the character of the proceeding as "a complex admixture of
legal, business, financial and economic problems" is at no point "more
manifest than in the formulation and scrutiny of the reorganization
plan itself."'" Accordingly, the general consensus is first that the
Commission's participation provides the necessary input for making
the statutory determination that a plan is "fair and equitable and
feasible" and second that its services have been most valuable."'
D. Compensation
Chapter X provides "detailed machinery" 122 which governs both
claims for costs and expenses incurred in the administration of the
debtor's estate as well as claims of compensation for services
rendered.' 23
 While the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction
"" 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970).
"" Note, The Role of the SEC in Corporate Reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act,
1958 ILL. L. Foil, 631, 640-41 (1958). In this connection, the Commission has remarked:
Bankruptcy reorganization ... is a significant source of entry of
new securities into the public trading markets. Under the exemption from
registration these securities may not be accompanied by disclosure of fun-
damental information available for other new issues. For this and other
reasons of a technical nature, such as a probable preponderance of sellers
immediately after reorganization, the 'after-market' for such securities is
particularly sensitive to distortion and disruption. SEC RErowr oN
PROPOSED LEGISLATION,Stipra note 5, at 101-02.
To protect security holders, the Commission will insist that securities issued pur-
suant to a plan be in exchange for the debtor's securities; that the old stock have some
intrinsic value; and that the exemption he merely transactional and does not in and of
itself create an exempt security. 40 SEC ANN. REP. 129 (1974). See generally Corotto,
Debtor Relief Proceedings Under the Bankruptcy Act and the Securities Act qf 1933—The Regis-
tration Requirement and Its Implications, 25 H ASTING'S U. 389 (1974).
12"
 6 Cot.t.•k„supra note 4, 1 7.30 at 1258.
'" See authorities collected in Id. 17.30 at 1258 n.16.
' 22
 6 Couirx supra note 4, 113.02 at 899.
123
 The statute vests the judge with the authority to "allow reimbursement fur
proper costs and expenses incurred by the petitioning creditors and reasonable com-
pensation for services rendered and reimbursement for expenses incurred ... by"
referees, special masters, trustees or other officers and their attorneys, the attorney of
the debtor, and the attorney for the petitioning creditors. Bankruptcy Act, § 241, 11
U.S.C. 641 (1970). Similar awards may be made to indenture trustees, depositaries,
reorganization managers, committees or representatives of creditors or stockholders, as
well as to "any other parties in interest." Id, § 242, 11 U.S.C. * 642 (1970). Additional
provision is made for expenses and compensation for creditors, stockholders and their
attorneys in connection with the submission of suggestions or proposals of a plan. Id., §
243, 11 U.S.C. § 643 (1970), See id., §§ 244, 245, II U.S.C. §§ 644, 645 (1970) (when
petition is filed in pending bankruptcy proceeding); id., §§ 246, 248, 11 U.S.C. §§ 646,
648 (1970) (upon dismissal of proceeding or adjudication of bankruptcy); id., § 249, I I
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over all compensation and expenses,'" the Commission has played a
major role in the court's determination of the propriety and amount
of such allowances. Courts commonly will request the SEC to submit
its recommendations on the "disposition of fee applications.'" In
response to such requests, the Commision often conducts extensive
investigations resulting in detailed reports to the court. The
magnitude of the task,'" together with the experience"' and
independence' 28
 of the Commission, in practice have insured that the
SEC's recommendations will be afforded substantial weight.'"
The substance of the SEC's recommendations is, in turn, a
U.S.C. § 649 (1970) (requiring statement by persons petitioning for allowances of claims
or stock acquired or transferred after commencement of the proceeding). Related pro-
visions affirming judicial control over allowances include: id., §§ 212, 216(3), 221(4), 11
U.S.C. §§ 612, 616(3), 621(4) (1970). The enactment of these provisions was largely a
response to extensive criticism of the widespread abuse in the practice of reorganization
allowances. See Note, The SEC and Allowance in Corporals Reorganization, 42 GEO. L. J.
420, 421 (1954).
124 Woods
 v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 267 (1941). See sections
of the Bankruptcy Act cited supra note 123.
In See, e.g., In re Inland Gas Corp., 193 F. Supp. 62, 64 (E.D. Ky. 1961). SEC
Counsel also will participate regularly in the cross-examination of fee applicants during
the hearing on the awards. See, e.g., In re TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 434 F.2d 804, 807
(5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971),
The magnitude of the problem as it may arise in any particular case is exemp-
lified by In re Yuba Consul. Indus., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 930 (N.D. Cal. 1966), where the
transcript alone of the hearings on compensation applications occupied 10 volumes with
946 pages of transcript. Id. at 933.
'" In the last five years, for example, the Commission has reviewed 1547 appli-
cations claiming more than a total of $60 million. 41 SEC ANN. REP. l56 (1975) (411
applications for a total of $21.1 million); 40 SEC ANN. REP. 130 (1974) (319 applications
for a total of $11 million); 39 SEC ANN. REP. 125 (1973) (319 applications for a total of
$14 million); 38 SEC ANN. REP. 124 (1972) (275 applications for a total of $7 million);
37 SEC ANN. REP. 191 (1971) (223 applications for a total of $7 million).
The SEC can also draw on its experience with allowances in its own reorganiza-
tion proceedings under the Holding Company Act, 2 Loss„supra note 5, at 762.
128 The Commission itself is not eligible for compensation. Bankruptcy Act, §
242(2), 11 U.S.C. § 642(2) (1970).
' 29 See, e.g., In re Imperial "400" Nat'l Inc., 432 F.2d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 1970)
("Because of ... [the SEC's] ... experience in such matters, its impartiality, and its sole
familarity with the relevant facts in this case, its recommendations should be given great
weight."); In re TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 434 F.2d 804, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971) ("The [SEC] having participated fully in these
proceedings (now in their thirteenth year), from the very beginning of the filing of the
chapter X reorganization, is intimately familiar with the services rendered by the
Committee's counsel ...." Therefore, the Court determined it "should follow the SEC
recommendation ... which we consider fair and reasonable ...."); Scribner & Miller v.
Conway, 238 F.2d 905, 907 (2d Cir. 1956) (The court should follow the SEC's recom-
mendations "unless the reorganization judge showed reasons otherwise based on
specific findings."). But see In re Yuba Consol. Indus., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 930, 950-51
(N.D. Cal. 1966) (criticism of SEC recommendations).
The Commission's recommendations, however, are advisory only and may not
substitute for the independent judgment of the court. Chicago & West Towns Rys. v.
Friedman, 230 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir, 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 943 (1956). See S.
REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 45 (1937).
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function of the dual purpose of the statutory fee provisions. On one
hand, the Chapter X allowance machinery seeks to protect the assets
of the reorganized corporation against unnecessary depletion.'" On
the other hand, it seeks to broaden the base of allowances to
encourage more active participation by creditors, stockholders and
their attorneys, thereby insuring that the reorganization proceedings
are not dominated by a minority of the parties in interest. 13 ' To
effectuate these underlying purposes, the SEC, in rendering its
recommendations to the court, has focused on three major issues:
whether the services were compensable, whether the applicants are
disinterested, and whether the amounts requested are reasonable.' 32
Furthermore, the Commission has participated most actively in cases
requiring a construction of section 249' 33 which disallows
compensation to any applicant who has traded in the debtor's
securities. 124
 Nevertheless, categorization of the Commission's role is
difficult. Aside from its uniformly rigorous review of allowance appli-
cations for evidence of possible conflict of interest' 35 or inside
' 3° Steinberg, Salient Features in Awarding Allowances in Corporate Reorganization
Proceedings and the Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Their Final Determina-
tion, 8 N.Y. LAw FoR. 253, 266 (1962); Note, The SEC and Allowances in Corporate
Reorganization, 42 Gm. L.J. 420, 424 (1954).
131 Steinberg, Salient Features in Awarding Allowances in Corporate Reorganization
Proceedings and the Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Their Final Determina-
tion, 8 N.Y. LAW FOR, 253, 266 (1962). Hearings on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 186
(1937) (statement of then SEC Commissioner, now retired Justice, Douglas), See 6A
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 113.12 at 976-77 (14th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
CowER]. See also Teton, Reorganization Revised, 48 YALE L.J. 573, 603-04 (1939).
132
 For a discussion of the factors to be considered in setting an award for com-
pensation, see In re Yuba Consol. Indus., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 930, 937-38 (N.D. Cal.
1966); Steinberg, Salient Features in Awarding Allowances in Corporate Reorganization Pro-
ceedings and the Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in their Final Determination, 8
N.Y. L. Fos. 253, 270-75 (1962).
In addition to making recommendations concerning the merits of particular
claims, the Commission also may comment on the feasiblity of awarding the total re-
quested claims in view of the particular status of the debtor's finances. Note, The Role of
the SEC in Corporate Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1958 U. ILL. L. Fox. 631,
641 (1958).
'" Section 249, 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1970) provides:
Any persons seeking compensation for services rendered or reimburse-
ment for costs ... incurred , . shall file with the court a statement [of]
claims against, or stock of, the debtor ... in which a beneficial interest ...
has been acquired or transferred ... after the commencement of such
proceedings. No compensation or reimbursement shall be allowed to any
... person acting ... in a fiduciary capacity, who [has traded in] such
claims or stock ... without the prior consent or subsequent approval of
the judge . . . .
' 3 ' Note, The SEC and Allowances in Corporate Reorganization, 42 GEo. L. J. 420,
427 (1954).
133
 The Supreme Court has long been of the view that "'reasonable compensa-
tion for services rendered' necessarily implies loyal and disinterested service in the in-
terest of those for whom the claimant purported to act." Wood v. City Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co„ 312 U.S. 262, 268 (1941). For an example of a case where the SEC success-
fully challenged allowances to applicants with conflicts of interest, see London v.
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trading,'" its position varies as it attempts, in different fact situations,
to effectuate the somewhat conflicting purposes of the fee provisions
of the statute. Thus, in the name of the economy, the SEC has par-
ticipated in numerous cases with the end of eliminating claims that
are excessive"' or that seek compensation for services that are sus-
pect, not beneficial to the estate or only tenuously connected with the
reorganization.' 38 At the same time, with the end of encouraging in-
creased participation, the SEC also has appeared to argue the neces-
sity of higher fees'" and to support the recognition of the rights of a
larger class of claimants.' 40 However, the courts' natural predilection
for economy"' suggest that the Commission's influence may be more
Snyder, 163 F.2d 621, 626 (8th Cir. 1947). The SEC's advisory recommendations on
awards for allowances from the debtor's estate are one of its most effective sanctions in
monitoring the qualification and performance of fiduciaries,
135 See Note, The SEC and Allowances in Corporate Reorganization, 42 GEO. L.J. 420,
433 (1954). The Supreme Court has decided that § 249 must be strictly construed. Wolf
v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 654-56 (1963). See generally Troiano, Bankruptcy Act—Section
249 of Chapter X—Disallowance if Compensation to Fiduciary for Trading in Stock of Debtor
during Corporate Reorganization—"Uncompromised Rigidity", 34 BROOKLYN L. REv. 179
(1968).
' 37 In re TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 434 F.2d 804, 806.07 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curium), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971). In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 432 F.2d 232,
234 (3d Cir. 1970). Yale Express Sys., Inc., (S.D.N.Y. No. 65-B-404), reported in 40 SEC
ANN. REP. 130 (1974). In re Yuba Consolidated Indus., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 930, 966 (N.D.
Cal. 1966).
' 3" In re Postal Tele. 8c,Cable Corp., 119 F.2d 861, 863 (2d Cir, 1941) (compensa-
tion denied attorney of debtor who worked with committee in opposing unsuccessfully,
adoption of a plan); Four Seasons Nursing Centers of Am., Inc., (W.D. Okla., No. BK
70-1008), reported in 39 SEC ANN, REP. 125-26 (1973) (recommending reduction in al-
lowances claimed by indenture trustee who spent a large portion of its time reviewing
papers filed by others in the proceeding and many of whose efforts duplicated the ac-
tivities of its counsel). Similarly, the SEC will contest allowances made without adequate
compliance with the mandatory notice provisions. In re Cybern Educ., Inc., 478 F.2d
1340, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
' 3" In re Farrington Mfg. Co., (4th Cir., No. 75-1355), reported in 41 SEC ANN,
REP. 157 (1975); In re General Economics Corp., 360 F.2d 762, 764 (2d Cir. 1966). In In
re Farrington, the Commission supported an appeal from an order of allowance for ser-
vices taken by counsel to the trustee and urged that trustee's counsel was a court-
appointed officer entitled to reasonable compensation, not a volunteer who is compen-
sated on the basis of the benefit to the estate. 41 SEC ANN. REP. 157 (1975). In particu-
lar, the Commission cited three factors which it argued that the district judge had failed
to balance against the needs for economy: (1) the importance of awarding reasonable
compensation in cases where the standard of counsel's performance was not questioned
in order to encourage the participation of competent counsel; (2) the crucial impor-
tance of the section 167 investigation and (3) that the result of the investigation and of
the trustee's participation in certain lawsuits was to increase both participation in the
plan and the distribution to creditors. Id.
'See, e.g., In re Farrington Mfg. Co., (4th Cir., No. 75-1355), reported in 41 SEC
ANN. REP. 157 (1975); In re Mt. Forest Fur Farms of Am., 62 E. Supp. 59 (S.D. Mich.
1945), affd, 157 F.2d 640 (6th Cir. 1946).
"' See Callaghan v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 297 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1936);
Note, The SEC and Allowances in Corporate Reorganization, 42 GEO. L.J. 420, 424 (1954).
Courts, for example, do not hesitate to award allowances lower than those recom-
mended by the Commission. See, e.g., In re Coast Investors, Inc., 388 F.2d 622, 626-27
(9th Cir. 1968).
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strongly felt when exercised in the promotion of that purpose) ."
II. CHAPTER XI ARRANGEMENTS
There is a marked contrast between the procedures of Chapter
X which contemplate "reorganization in the grand manner" 43 and
the more summary provisions of Chapter XI.' 44 In contrast to the
broader scope of Chapter X which is carefully designed to protect the
interests of stockholders and creditors, 145 Chapter XI simply affects
the rights of "general creditors who have been deemed by Congress to
need only the minimal disinterested protection provided by that
chapter."'" Accordingly, for all practical purposes, the entire Chapter
XI proceeding is in the hands of the debtor who generally remains in
possession,' 47 operates the business' 48 and proposes the ar-
rangernent.' 4 " Furthermore, little independent oversight is contem-
plated by Chapter XI, in that It makes no provision for a study of the
debtor by a trustee, nor does it authorize the court to approve the
plan or to communicate its advice to creditors in advance of the
debtor's solicitation of their acceptances.' 5" These summary pro-
142 Note, The SEC and Allowances in Corporate Reorganization, 42 GEO. L.J. 420, 427
(1954).
143
 Rostow & Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and
XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YAI,E L.J. 1334 (1939).
144 For a comparison of the different characteristics of Chapters X and XI, see
SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 603-07 (1965); RErowr OE THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. part I. 244-45 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION
REPORT].
"i SEC v. American '['railer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 605 (1965). Chapter X
reorganizations may affect the interests of both secured and unsecured creditors. Bank-
ruptcy Act § 216(1), I l U.S.C. § 616(1) (1970).
146
 SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 606-07 (1965). Chapter
XI arrangements provide only for the adjustment of unsecured debt. Bankruptcy Act, §
356, II U.S.C. § 756 (1970).
14 Bankruptcy Act, § 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970); SEC v. American Trailer Ren-
tals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 606 (1965). The debtor remains in possession unless a trustee or
receiver is appointed. Bankruptcy Act, § 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970). The court will
appoint a trustee only in those very limited situations where a trustee in bankruptcy has
previously been appointed. Id., MI 321, 332, 11 U.S.C. §§ 721, 732 (1970). The court
"may" appoint a receiver upon application of any party in interest if it finds such ap-
pointment to be "necessary." Id., § 332, 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1970).
14  hL, §§ 342, 343, 11 U.S.C. §§ 742, 743 (1970). Authorization to operate the
business must be obtained from the bankruptcy court. Ch. Xi R. 11-23.
14 " Id., §§ 306(1), 323, 357, ll U.S.C. §§ 706(I), 723, 757 (1970).
' 60
 The debtor may solicit acceptances of' the plan of arrangement even before the
filing of the proceeding and must solicit them before the court's approval of the plan.
SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co„ 379 U.S. 594, 606 (1965); Bankruptcy Act, §
336(4), 11 U.S.C. § 736(4) (1970); see note 175 infra. In addition, creditors have only
the choice of accepting or rejecting the plan. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379
U.S. 594, 606 (1965).
Furthermore, while Chapter X applies the absolute priority rule, Chapter XI
tests the fairness of a plan as to general creditors against what they would receive in a
liquidation. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT,SUpyl note 144, at '245.
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cedures, however, are consistent with the basic purpose of Chapter XI
which is "to provide a quick and economical means of facilitating sim-
ple compositions among general creditors 
...."'"
The significant differences in both the scope and source of the
Commission's involvement in Chapter X and Chapter XI cases reflect
the distinct character of the two proceedings. While the SEC, by
statutory mandate,'" plays a major role under Chapter X, the
Commission's involvement is far more restricted in the simpler, more
expedited procedures of Chapter XI. Its statutory role, in fact, simply
reflects the fact that the choice between proceeding under Chapter X
or Chapter XI is not optional with the debtor. Indeed, "Congress has
made it quite clear that [they] are not alternate routes," but instead
constitute "legally, mutually exclusive paths to attempted financial
rehabilitation."'" Thus, Chapter XI only expressly grants standing to
the Commission for the purpose of making a conversion motion "to
have the case proceed under Chapter X ....." 154 In SEC v. American
Trailer Rentals Co., 155 however, the Supreme Court expanded the
Commision's Chapter XI role and held that "under the statutory
scheme, while not charged with express statutory rights and
responsibilities ... , the SEC is entitled to intervene and be heard in a
Chapter XI proceeding."'" Although the Commission, in the past,
151
 SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 606-07 (1965).
1"
 See text & notes 24.33 & 100-09 supra.
153
 SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 607 (1965). Proceedings
under Chapter XI may be dismissed, or in effect transferred, if they "should have been
brought" under Chapter X. Bankruptcy Act, § 328, 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970). Similarly, a
Chapter X petition will be deemed not to have been Filed in good faith, and therefore
will be subject to dismissal, if "adequate relief would be obtainable" under Chapter XI.
Id., §§ 141, 146(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 546(2) (1970).
1"
 Bankruptcy Act, § '328, 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970). Section 328 provides in part,
ltlhe judge may, upon application of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission or any party in interest, and upon such notice to the debtor, to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, ... if he finds that the proceedings
should have been brought under Chapter 10 , enter an order dismiss-
ing the proceedings under this Chapter ....
In 1940, the Supreme Court, in SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co.,
held that the Commission could properly intervene in Chapter XI proceedings to .advo-
cate dismissal of the case on the ground that Chapter XI, when compared to Chapter
X, was inadequate to protect public investors. 310 U.S. 434, 458 (1940). When Congress
amended Chapter X1 in 1952, it specifically codified this holding in § 328. Act of July
7, 1952, c. 579, § 30, 66 Stat. 432.
Under Ch. XI R. 11-15, which became effective as of July 1, 1974, the Commis-
sion or other party in interest, has 120 days from the first date set for the first meeting
of creditors to file a motion, which time maybe extended for good cause. The debtor,
however, may move for transfer to Chapter X at any time. Because the Rule requires a
showing that the case may properly proceed under Chapter X, in effect, the court can
grant the motion only if it finds both that Chapter XI is inadequate and that Chapter X
is feasible. 41 SEC ANN. REP. l58 (1975).
' 45 379 U.S. 594 (1965):
156 1d. at 613.
that
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has played a more limited role in Chapter XI cases,'" this difference
in the scope of its involvement may tend to narrow in practice as the
SEC's role in Chapter XI expands to reflect the fact that. larger
corporations, with more extensive public holdings, increasingly rely on
Chapter XI as the vehicle for their rehabilitation.'" Nevertheless, the
two central issues with respect to the SEC's role in Chapter XI cases
continue to be those surrounding its decisions of when to petition for
conversion to Chapter X and whether to intervene in the Chapter XI
proceeding.
A. Conversion Motions
Delineation of the factors that the Commission considers
important in determining whether to move for conversion is essential
because there is no clear standard for choosing between Chapters X
and XI other than the vague "needs to be served" test's" and be-
cause the Commission is often the sole participant advocating
removal"" The courts have consistently rebuffed the SEC's
position that the mere presence of numerous public investors is alone
sufficient to mandate resort to Chapter X."' Nevertheless, large
157 See Manufacturers' Credit Corp. v. SEC, 395 F.2d 833, 842 (3d Cir. 1968),
where the court noted that the SEC's standing to intervene in Chapter XI cases "should
not be equated with the SEC's hill power to investigate and report under Chapter X
I" BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 144, at 246. Although propo-
nents of Chapter XI generally laud its speed and economy, the real reason underlying
the preference for Chapter XI is the extent of control retained by the debtor under
that chapter. Id. at 247. For the suggestion that the Supreme Court, in granting the
SEC standing to intervene in Chapter XI cases, did not contemplate a comparable de-
gree of administrative participation, see text infra at note 196.
'" See American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. at 610; General Stores, Inc. v.
Schlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956).
The "needs to be served" test was first applied by Justice Douglas in General
Stores where he noted that neither the character of the debtor, nor its capital structure
was the controlling consideration. '350 U.S. at 466. Instead, he observed that
film may well be that in most cases where the debtor's securities are publicly
held c. X will afford the more appropriate remedy. But that is not neces-
sarily so. A large company with publicly held securities may have as much
need for a simple composition of unsecured debts as a smaller company.
And there is no reason ... why c. XI may not serve that end. The essen-
tial difference is not between the small company and the large company
but between the needs to be served. Id.
The "needs" identified by Justice Douglas which might mandate the use of Chap-
ter X include: the necessity of sacrifice by the stockholders and the need for an ac-
counting by the management for misdeeds or for new management. Id.
le° See Weintraub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations) as Proposed by the Bank-
ruptcy Commission: The Widening Cap Between Theory and Reality, 47 Ana. BANKR. LT 323,
324 (1973). Occasionally, when other parties petition for review on the ground that a
proceeding under Chapter XI should have been brought under Chapter X, the SEC
may appear in support of the court's jurisdiction to confirm the arrangement. See In re
Posi-Seal Intl, Inc., 457 F.2d 237, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
See, e.g., American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. at 607, 611; General Stores, Inc.
v. Schlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956); In re Lea Fabrics, Inc., 272 F.2d 769, 771 (3d
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public holdings clearly invite close SEC scrutiny 132
 as the Commission
continues to stress the number and sophistication of the debtor's
public investors in advocating removal.'" Furthermore, on a case by
case basis, the Commission successfully has argued the significance of
the fact that the debtor's rehabilitation requires "a substantial
adjustment of widely-held public debt."'" Additional criteria stressed
by the SEC in arguing for removal include the need either for new
competent managemene" or for a thOrough investigation of the
debtor by an independent trustee.'" A successful petition for
conversion will serve' to address these problems because Chapter X
may require the appointment of a disinterested trustee to take
possession of the assets of the debtor,'" whereas Chapter XI
generally permits the debtor to continue in possession subject to the
supervisory control of the court.' 66 Furthermore, the Commission is
likely to press for removal where the possibility of federal securities
laws violations raises the question of whether these contingent claims
Cir. 1959), appeal vacated as moot sub nom. SEC v. Lea Fabrics, Inc., 363 U.S. 417 (1960);
SEC v. Liberty Baking Corp., 240 F.2(1 511, 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930
(1957). When the Court in General Stores, supra, rejected the Commission's position that
the presence of publicly held securities was determinative, the SEC introduced correc-
tive legislation to preclude resort to Chapter XI by a corporate debtor that had se-
curities owned by 100 or more persons. See 6 SEC ANN. REP. 55-57 (1940). The legisla-
tion did not pass. BANKRUPTCY COMNIISSION REvoirr,supra note 144, at 246.
"2 8 COLLIER, supra note 131, 44.22 at 467. See American Trailer Rentals Co.,
379 U.S. at 614.
123
 40 SEC ANN. REP.131-33 (1974). See Norman Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. SEC, 415
F.2d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir: 1969) (unsophisticated depositors in "Thrift Saving Ac-
counts").
'm Manufacturers' Credit Corp. v. SEC, 395 F.2d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1968); In re
Arlan's Dept. Store, 373 F. Supp. 520, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See American Trailer Rent-
als Co., 379 U.S. at 614, 615; SEC v. Canandaigua Enterps. Corp., 339 F.2d 14, 19-20
(2d Cir. 1964).
' 64 See, e.g., American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. at 614-15; Norman Fin. &
Thrift Corp. v. SEC, 415 F.2d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Crumpton Builders,
Inc., 337 F.2d 907, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1964); ef: In re Meister Brau, Inc., 355 F. Supp.
515, 517 (N.D. III. 1972) (meni.) (petition filed by debtor's shareholders; SEC took no
position on the merits of the petition. Id. at 517 n.3).
'" See, e.g., American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. at 615; Norman Fin. & Thrift
Co. v. SEC, 415 F.2d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Liberty Baking Corp., 240
F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957). One commentator has argued
that evidence of past corporate mismanagement should be the determining factor in
choosing between Chapters X and XI. See Katskee, The Calculus of Corporate Reorganiza-
tion Chapter X v. XI and the Role of the SEC Assessed, 45 Am, SANER. L.J. 171, 189-90
(1971).
In some cases, however, courts have refused to transfer a Chapter XI arrange-
ment, and have discounted the necessity of a trustee's investigation on the grounds that
an investigation accomplished by the referee would be sufficient. See In re American
Guaranty Corp., 221 F. Supp. 961, 967 (D. R.I. 1963). Cf. In re Lea Fabrics, 272 F.2d
769, 772 (3d Cir. 1959), vacated as moot sub nom. SEC v. Lea Fabrics, Inc., 363 U.S. 417
(1960) (per curiam).
67 See text at notes 36-37 supra.
"8 See note 147 supra. For a comparison of these aspects of Chapters X and XI,
see American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. at 606.
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can be discharged under the limited scope of Chapter XI.""' By
moving for conversion to Chapter X, the SEC facilitates the
adjudication of contingent securities fraud claims and their inclusion
in the Chapter X plan of reorganization.'"
The SEC's ability to petition for conversion from Chapter XI to
Chapter X is critical to its ability to - protect the interests of public
investors. Although there is no absolute rule that Chapter X must be
used when the debtor is publicly owned, Chapter X, nevertheless, is
generally the "appropriate proceeding for adjustment of publicly held
debt.""' By seeking to insure that the rehabilitation of corporate
debtors . with widespread public holdings proceed under Chapter X,
the SEC guarantees that the interests of public investors will be
safeguarded by the more extensive provisions for disinterested
protection included in that chapter.
B. Intervention by the SEC
In cases where the Commission has determined not to exercise
its statutory authority to petition for a conversion to Chapter X, it
nevertheless is crucial to identify those factors which may lead it to
exercise its judicial grant of standing to intervene. In the past, the
Commission has intervened most frequently in Chapter XI cases
where the plan of arrangement contemplates the issuance of
securities.'"
The likelihood that a proposal to issue securities pursuant to a
plan of arrangement will trigger SEC intervention highlights one of
the critical differences between Chapter X and Chapter XI. The
issuance of securities pursuant to a Chapter X reorganization plan is
hedged with statutory protective devices. Thus, there can be no solici-
tation of acceptances of the Chapter X reorganization plan until after
it has been approved by the court.' 73
 Furthermore, a wide range of
disclosure information, including the opinion of the judge and any
reports filed by the SEC, must be submitted to the creditors and stock-
holders in conjunction with the solicitation of their acceptances of the
"19
 See, e.g., U.S. Fin., Inc., (S.D. Cal., No. 17007-K), reported in 41 SEC ANN. Ru'.
158-59 (1975); Equitable Mortgage Inv. Corp., (S.D. Iowa, Nos. 74-509-C, 74-528-C,
74-537-C), reported in 41 SEC ANN. Ru'. 160-61 (1975). Under § 17a(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U,S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1970), fraud claims are not dischargeable in Chapter
Xl. As they are unliquidated and contingent, they also cannot be proved and therefore
cannot be allowed. Bankruptcy Act, § 57(d), 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1970).
"" A Chapter X proceeding is not limited to the adjustment of unsecured or
fixed claims. On the contrary, it defines claims to "include all claims of whatever
character , whether or not such claims are provable ... and whether secured or un-
secured, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent." Bankruptcy Act, § 106(1), I1
U.S.C. § 506(1) (1970).
"' American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. at 613.
112
 The Commission staff has made a practice of communicating with referees
around the country requesting notification of arrangements which may propose this
type of issuance. 38 SEC ANN. REV. 130 17.60 (1972).
1 " Bankruptcy Act, § 176, I I U.S.C. § 576 (1970).
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plan." 4 In a Chapter XI case, however, there is a far greater potential
for the issuance of deceptive securities. Acceptances of a Chapter XI
plan of arrangement may be solicited even before the filing of the
procedure and always before the court's approval of the plan.'"
Furthermore, the debtor who proposed the plan is also the one to so-
licit acceptances and such solicitation is accomplished with only limited
judicial scrutiny.'" This comparative lack of protection afforded
public investors in the consummation of a Chapter XI plan of
arrangement sensitizes the Commission to attempts to circumvent
applicable provisions of the federal securities laws.' 77
Because the Commission often intervenes expressly in order to
thwart attempts to circumvent the federal securities laws, its role in
Chapter XI cases is perhaps more narrowly directed to securing
appropriate protection for the rights of the public investors in
conjunction with the issuance of securities pursuant to a plan of
arrangement. In particular, the SEC has characterized the purpose of
its intervention in these circumstances as twofold. It seeks both
to develop the record as to adequacy of the disclosure of
material facts and to assist the court in its task of
scrutinizing securities which were to be issued pursuant to
an arrangement and thus prevent the distribution of stock
of doubtful value to an unsuspecting public."a
As well as participating in order to insure adequate disclosure, the
Commission also will intervene to challenge a plan on the grounds
that it lacks the "good faith" required by section 366(4) 179 when the
issuance of securities pursuant to the plan appeared to be motivated
more by a desire to participate in a rising market than by a good faith
attempt to resuscitate the debtor.' 5 °
In addition to its efforts in monitoring the issuance of securities
'" Id., §§ 175, 176, 11 U.S.C. § 575, 576 (1970).
1 " Manufacturers' Credit Corp. v. SEC, 395 F.2c1 833, 842 (3d Cir. 1968).
Corotto, SEC Reporting, Proxy and Antifraud Compliance—An Additional Perspective on
Bankruptcy • Reorganization Proceedings, 63 CALIF. L. Rev. 1563, 1578-79 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Corolla
""Corotto, supra note 175, at 1579. The application of SEC proxy requirements
to Chapter X and X1 plan solicitations reflects these differences in the statutory
framework. Solicitations of acceptances of Chapter X plans are exempt from the proxy
requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, R. 14a-2(e), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-2(e) (1974). Corotto, supra note 175, at 1580-81.
However. , these proxy requirements may apply to the debtor's solicitation of consents
under Chapter XI. ld.
1 " The trustee, receiver or debtor in possession is responsible for compliance
with the requirements of applicable state and federal laws. 6A COLLIER. supra note 131,
1 8.12 at 47-50. See Corotto, supra note 175, at 1567-71.
179 In re Puts & Calls, Inc., (C.D. Cal., No. 75-03706, 1973). reported in 40 SEC
ANN. Rep. 152 (1974).
"9 I 1 U.S.C. § 766(4) (1970).
1 " in re Alco Universal, (W.D. Mich., No. 370-72-B5, 1972), reported in 39 SEC
ANN. REP. 127 (1973).
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pursuant to the plan of arrangement, the Commission also assumes a
familiar, albeit a more limited, role as expert advisor with respect to
other issues arising in the course of a Chapter XI proceeding. Thus,
in keeping with its practice in its appearances in Chapter X cases, the
SEC is actively concerned with the status and performance of other
parties in interest."' The Commission, for example, often intervenes
for the purpose of replacing a debtor continued in possession with a
receiver,'" particularly in cases involving allegations of mismanage-
ment," 3
 or violations of federal securities laws.'" Similarly, the SEC
may assist the court in determining the qualifications of the attorney
retained by the debtor."' Furthermore, the SEC may lend its
investigative resources to the court. However, because Chapter XI
makes no provision for an independent study by the court or a
trustee or for the communication of,their advice to creditors in
advance of the acceptance of the plan,'" the investigation conducted
by the SEC in these circumstancesjs likely to be more limited'" and
to become significant primarily wlien the court is ruling on conversion
petitions brought by another party. [ ""
'"' The Commission's role, however, is perforce more limited because in Chapter
X1 there is no regulation of creditor representatives whereas .Chapter imposes
fiduciary standards and full disclosure of' relationships. BANKatfrrq:CommissioN
REroxr.strpra note 144, at 245.
.•
1 "See, e.g., In re Peoples Loan & Inv. Co., 4 10 F.2d 851. ; n 85,4•(8th Cir. 1969)
(The Court, however, adopted the recommendation of the•. rel4C and denied the
SEC's motion.); In re investors' Equity, Inc., (S.D. Iowa,
	 reported in 41
SEC ANN. REP. 160-61 (1975).	 •
' 3 In re American Beef Packers, Inc., (D. Neb., No. Bk-75-0-17) reported in 41
SEC ANN. REP, 160 (1975); In re Investors' Equity, Inc., (S.D. Iowa, No. 74-464-C),
reported in 4 1 SEC ANN, 1•01 ,, 160-61 (1975).
184 In re Investors' Equity, Inc., (S.D. Iowa, No, 74-464-C), reported in 41 SEC
ANN, REP, 160-61 (1975). Similarly, the fact that the debtor's management is the subject
of investigation by other stale and federal agencies is likely to be a significant factor. See
In re American Beef Packers, Inc„ (1). Neb., No. Bk-75.0-17), reported in 41 SEC ANN,
REP, 160 (1975).
'" In In re Longchamps, Inc„ (S.D.N.Y., No. 75-B-953), reported in 41 SEC ANN.
REP. 162 (1975), the debtor sought to retain, as its counsel in the proceeding, a law firm
which asserted a substantial secured claim for services rendered prior to the filing of
the Chapter. XI petition. When the court turned to it for advice, the SEC concurred
with the court's decision disqualifying the firm on the grounds that questions 'night
arise with respect to the amount of the firm's claim or the validity of its security in-
terest. Id.
' "" American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. at 606.
1 " In In re Meister Bran, Inc., (N.D. 111., No. 72-B-3965), reported in 39 SEC ANN.
REP, 127 (1973), for example, the SEC prepared an investigation at the request of the
court which was prepared entirely from the debtor's records and other public informa-
tion.
'""See In re Posi-Seal 1nel, Inc., 457 F.2d 237, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1972) (per
curiam); In re Meister Brau, Inc., (N.D. Ill., No. 72-B-3965), reported in 39 SEC ANN.
REr. 127 (1973). In that case, in connection with a § 328 conversion motion filed by
shareholders, the Commission conducted a preliminary investigation, but declined to
take any position on the motion because of its doubts that the debtor could be reor-
ganized. The court subsequently denied the motion and requested the SEC to continue
its investigation. Ultimately, the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt. id.
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The Commission also has intervened infrequently in conjunction
with other matters arising in the course of the administration of the
debtor's estate. It may appear to support or to contest the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to take certain action. In
Cavanagh Communities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,' 9° for
example, the Commission filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
the New York Stock Exchange's appeal from the bankruptcy court's
order enjoining the Exchange from filing an application with the
Commission to delist the debtor's common stock and convertible
subordinated debentures."' The bankruptcy judge had ruled that the
stock exchange listing constituted "property" of the debtor which
therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court. 112 On ap-
peal, however, the court agreed with the SEC's contention that the
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction because section 12(d) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 193
 vests exclusive jurisdiction over the
delisting process with the Commission. 114 In addition to concerning it-
self with jurisdictional matters, the SEC also has appeared to contest
the sufficiency of consideration offered in a sale of major assets of the
debtor."'
Despite this evident variety of purposes for which the Commis-
sion will intervene in a Chapter XI case, its participation has been
considerably more circumspect than the major role it has played in
Chapter X reorganizations. This marked distinction in the scope of its
involvement presumably results from three major factors. First, the
vehicle for its participation is not an express statutory provision but is
rather a judicial grant of standing to intervene. This judicial grant of
standing is qualified by the Supreme Court's suggestion that it did not
thereby indicate "the desirability of the [SEC's] performing its full
Chapter X functions.""8 Second, Chapter XI itself offers less oppor-
tunity for intervention by a public agency because, consistent with its
purpose of facilitating simple compositions among general
creditors, 117 its procedures are more summary. Third, by pressing for
conversion to Chapter X in cases which involve the substantial ad-
justment of widely held public debt,' 98 the SEC itself' may limit the
necessity for subsequent appearance on behalf of public investors in
1 " I n re Posi-Seal 1nel, Inc., 457 F.2d 237, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiani).
19" 422 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See 41 SEC ANN. REP. 161 (1975).
1 " 422 F. Supp. at 384. See 41 SEC ANN. REP. 161 (1975).
'" Id. at 384.
" 3 15 U.S.C. § 781(d) (1970).
1 " 422 F. Supp. at 385-87.
1 " In re Welfare Fin. Corp., (S.D. Ohio, No. 69085-6). reported in 40 SEC ANN.
1UP. 131 (1975).
' 9° American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. at 614 ("Where debt is publicly held, the
SEC is likely, as here, to have become familiar with the debtor's finances, indicating the
desirability of its performing its full Chapter X functions." (emphasis added) ); Manufac-
turers Credit Corp v. SEC, 395 F.2d 833, 842 (3d Cir. 1968).
1 " See text supra at notes 146-51.
" 8 See text supra at notes 159-71.
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Chapter X1 proceedings. These three factors serve to indicate that
while the restricted role assumed by the SEC in Chapter XI cases rep-
resents an accommodation with that chapter's more summary charac-
ter, it does not necessarily entail any lapse in the agency's efforts to
protect the public investor.
ROLE OF THE SEC UNDER PROPOSED REVISIONS
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
Recent proposed legislation aimed at revising the Bankruptcy
Act raises the prospect of a substantial alteration of the Commission's
current role in corporate reorganizations and arrangements. One bill,
prepared by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States,'" virtually abolishes the SEC's participation. It provides for the
creation of a new administrative agency which would exercise the ad-
ministrative functions now performed by bankruptcy judges and also
would assume the Commission's present responsibilities. A second
bill, proposed and introduced at the request of the National Confer-
ence of Bankruptcy Judges, 200
 makes more limited changes and ap-
parently contemplates the SEC's continued participation in reorgani-
zation proceedings. The SEC is generally opposed to the alterations in
its role as proposed in both pieces of legislation.'" The most recent
bill proposing revisions in the bankruptcy laws, introduced by Con-
gressman Edwards in the 95th Congress,212 appears to eliminate the
SEC's advisory participation in administrative aspects of reorganiza-
tion proceedings. At the same time, however, it would restructure the
procedure governing the confirmation of the plan and explicitly pro-
vide for SEC participation at that time. The SEC has not yet com-
mented officially on the substance of these proposed changes.
"" The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was established
by the Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The Commission Bill was
originally introduced in the summer of 1973 as S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. and H.R.
10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). It represents more than two years of intensive
study, hearings and drafting. Levit, Report of the Bankruptcy Committee of the Commercial
Law League of America on Proposed Reuisioro qf the Bankruptcy Act, SO Comm, L.J. 188
(1975). The Bankruptcy Commission's study and findings (Part I) and its proposed bill
and notes (Part 11) have been reprinted in the RErotrr OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Parts I and II , H.R. Doc. No, 137, 93d
Cong., lst Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT]. The bill
was reintroduced as S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) by Senator Burdick and re-
ferred to the Committee on the Judiciary, 121 CONC. REC. 5429 (January 17, 1975). It
was not reported out of committee and has not yet been reintroduced in the 95th Con-
gress.
20" S. 4060, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 16643, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
The bill was reintroduced .as S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
2"' See text and notes infra at 219-20 and 238-39.
2 °2
 The bill was introduced by Congressman Edwards, of California, for himself
and for Mr. Butler, as H.R, 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as the Ed-
wards Bill].
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A. The Bankruptcy Commission Bill
The Bankruptcy Commission Bill, as first introduced in 1973,
incorporates major substantive changes in the law of corporate reor-
ganization, many of which stem from its proposed creation of a new
administrative agency. The Commission recommends the severance of
the administrative from the judicial functions within the bankruptcy
system. 2113
 Accordingly, its bill would create a new United States Bank-
ruptcy Administration, 204
 to be operated through regional and local
officers within the executive branch of the federal government. The
Bankruptcy Administration would be "empowered to handle almost
all matters in proceedings under the Act which do not involve
litigation." 2 °8
 The judicial functions, on the other hand, would be per-
formed by bankruptcy judges appointed to bankruptcy courts also es-
tablished by the Act. 2 "8
That the new Bankruptcy Administration effectively would sup-
plant the SEC's present role in corporate reorganizations is most evi-
dent in the sections of the proposed Act governing the formulation of
the plan. Although the bill would require a report regarding a plan to
be submitted for a vote in every case where the plan would adversely
affect any publicly held securities, 207 it would transfer this function
from the SEC to the new Bankruptcy Administration. 2 °8
 The pro-
20 " BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 199, Part I, at 5-8.
The Commission concluded, in effect, that there was no reason to involve the
judge in matters which were purely administrative in nature. Id. at 5. Furthermore, it
found that there were substantial reasons fin• not entrusting litigation to bankruptcy
judges who had previously been involved in the administration of the litigated estates.
The tribunal's prior involvement in the resolution of administrative matters impaired
the litigants' confidence in the impartiality of its decision of a subsequently litigated
controversy. Also, it cast doubt on the court's ability to adjudicate that controversy sole-
ly from evidence presented to the trier. Id. Therefore, analogizing to the division of
function between the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court, the Commission re-
commended the creation of a new agency to handle administrative matters and thereby
implement the proposed severance of administrative and judicial functions. Id. at 6.
201
 Commission Bill, §§ 3-101-3-403. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
199, Part 111, at 51-66.
1" BANKRUPtCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 199, Part I, at 7.
2" Commission Bill, §§ 2-101-2-210; BANKRuvrcv Comm issioN REPORT, supra note
199, Part III, at 15-50.
"'Commission Bill, §§ 7-306, 7-307. The proposed act would define "publicly
held securities" as meaning "securities of a class the ownership of which is held of rec-
ord by 300 or more persons." Id., § 1-102(36). This should be distinguished from the
present practice which only requires the judge to submit the plan to the SEC for report
if the scheduled indebtedness exceeds $3,000,000. Bankruptcy Act, § 172, 11 U.S.C. §
572 (1976).
0" Commission Bill, § 7-306(b), provides that "[pirior to the date set for the hear-
ing on approval, the administrator shall file with the court an advisory report and a
summary thereof concerning the plan and modifications .... " One commentator, no-
ting a serious inconsistency in the statutory scheme, has questioned "by what sort of
jurisdictional legerdemain" the court may approve or confirm a plan in a case pending
before the Administrator. Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission Bill and the Judges'
Bill for the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 Am. BANKR. L. J. 1, 46 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Lee).
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posed Act is somewhat. less explicit as to the SEC's continued perfor-
mance of those advisory functions which it presently assumes pur-
suant to its statutory authority to intervene. 2"" The bill clearly con-
templates some continued participation by the SEC. It would provide
that the SEC will continue to receive "written notice ... of the com-
mencement of a [reorganization] case ... if the debtor is a corpora-
tion having 300 or more security holders and such other notices as it
may request in connection with the case or a class of cases. " 21 ° Fur-
thermore, it would authorize the SEC, together with other agencies
and persons given standing to intervene, to "appear and be heard in
the bankruptcy court respecting any matter that arises in the ad-
ministration of a case under Chapter VII," and enumerates a wide
range of matters as to which the bill expressly contemplates their
appearance. 211 The Bankruptcy Commission, however, has described
the purpose of these notice and standing provisions insofar as they
apply to the SEC as being merely
to solicit the cooperation and aid of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in any case where it has previously
conducted an investigation of the affairs of the debtor cor-
poration or where it may be peculiarly equipped to conduct
such an investigation during the course of the
proceedings. 212
Thus, it appears that the Commission's reading of the proposed Act
would virtually eliminate SEC participation in corporate reorganiza-
tions except insofar as the SEC might appear in order to fulfill its re-
sponsibilities under the federal securities laws or might afford the
Bankruptcy Administration the benefits of its prior discharge of its
duties under those Acts.
In recommending that the new Bankruptcy Administration sup-
plant the SEC, the Bankruptcy Commission, in effect, is attempting to
2"2 The Commission, however, explicitly contemplated that the Bankruptcy Ad-
ministrator, rather than the SEC, would make recommendations concerning fee and
expense applications. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 199, Part 1, at 249.
215 Commission Bill, § 7-107(c).
" 1 fd.,§ 2-205(b).
The bill expressly. accords standing to: the debtor, an indenture trustee, a cred-
itor, an equity security holder, authorized committees, the administrator, the SEC and
any State or Federal Commission having regulatory jurisdiction over a debtor that is a
public utility. Id. The enumerated matters of administration include the appointment of
an additional committee, the appointment or removal of a trustee, the dismissal or con-
version of the case to one for liquidation, a sale of all or substantially all of the property
of the estate, the approval and confirmation of the plan, and the setting aside of such
order of confirmation.
212 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REI'oR -r, supra note 199, Part I, at 26. See § 7-107(c),
Advisory Committee note 4, which characterized the notice provision as enabling the
SEC "to participate in any investigation where violations of federal securities law may
have occurred and to make available to the trustee the information accumulated from
any prior investigation by the Commission." See also § 7.306(b), Advisory Committee
note 3, which notes that the "present Chapter X functions of the (SEC] are to be per-
knned by the administrator."
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give more comprehensive statutory recognition to the theory that cor-
porate reorganizations are only incidentally law suits and, in fact,
primarily constitute an exercise in corporate finance and manage-
ment. In setting forth its rationale for supplanting the SEC, the Bank-
ruptcy Commission began from the premise that the "requirement for
the representation by a public agency of the public interest and the
interest of public investors in a reorganization proceeding is
essential. "213
 For two reasons, however, it concluded that the Bank-
ruptcy Administration should assume this responsibility. 214
 First, the
Commission reasoned that the SEC alone was not equipped to handle
the wider grant of administrative responsibility envisioned by the Act.
Although the SEC had played a "very constructive" role in Chapter X
cases, that role had been "very limited," 2 " both because the SEC's
participation in reorganization proceedings is "tangential to its major
statutory duties" and because "that function has not been adequately
funded in the past."" 6
 Therefore, the Commission concluded that
these new responsibilities—the "general policies of all bankruptcy
proceedings"—should be transferred to a new agency which "will be
intimately involved and familiar with all aspects of all bankruptcy
proceedings." 217
 Secondly, the Commission determined that not only
was the SEC ill-equipped to perform these new administrative func-
tions but also that it should not continue to fulfill its former duties
because "it would be undesirable for two agencies to perform similar
functions."2 ' 8
Both reasons advanced by the Bankruptcy Commission in sup-
port of its recommendation to displace the SEC's role in corporate
reorganizations are open to serious challenge. It is difficult to con-
ceive of the SEC's role in Chapter X cases .as "tangential" to its main
duties because Chapter X, at least in part, is an investor protection
statute. 2 " Furthermore, if the SEC can be faulted for playing only a
"limited" role, the appropriate solution would be to advocate in-
creased funding. 22" Further, it is not necessarily undesirable for two
213
 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 199, Part I, at 25-26.
"' Id. at 26.
215 1d. at 249.
218 1d. at 26.
212
 Id. at 26, 249. In addition, the Commission noted that the new agency would
be better able to obtain adequate funding for this particular function and to respond
promptly when called upon to render an advisory report. Id. at 26. Furthermore, the
proposed statute would authorize it to adopt rules and regulations governing the
solicitation of acceptances of all reorganization plans. Id.
" 8
 Id. at 249.
213
 See American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. at 614 ("Chapter X is one of the
many Acts in which the SEC has the statutory right and responsibility to protect public
investors," (footnote omitted) ); REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
ON PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION (S. 235 & S. 236), submitted to Subcommittee on
improvements in Judicial Machinery, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, December 8, 1975, at
16 [hereinafter cited as SEC RErowr ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION].
2
 This is the position taken by the SEC. See SEC REPORT ON PROPOSED
LEGISLATION, supra note 219, at 17.
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agencies to perform similar functions as long as the focus of their role
is different. 22 ' Rather than lose the substantial experience in corpo-
rate reorganizations acquired by the SEC, it seems preferable to allow
it to continue to concern itself with the investor protection aspects of
corporate reorganization proceedings. 222
B. The judges' Bill
The Bankruptcy Commission's proposal to establish a U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Administration drew particularly angry criticism from the bank-
ruptcy judges who had not been included in the Commission's
membership." The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges
thereafter issued its own proposal (the Judges' Bill) 224
 which paral-
leled the Commission Bill in many respects,' but recommended
maintaining the judicial delivery system while shifting some adminis-
trative responsibilities from the bankruptcy judges to an administra-
tive branch within the judiciary. 226 The Judges' Bill would create
within the Administrative Office of the United States Courts a Branch
221 The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C.
§,§ 791-98 (Supp. V 1975) (ESECA), while totally unrelated to corporate reorganiza-
tions, provides an interesting example of a statutory framework which institutionalizes
the participation of several administrative agencies in order to capitalize on their sepa-
rate areas of expertise. The Act is designed to promote national energy self-sufficiency
"in a manner which is consistent, to the fullest extent practicable, with existing national
commitments to protect and improve the environment ...." ESECA, I, 15 U.S.C.
791 (Stipp. V 1975). The statute, accordingly, is administered by the Federal Energy
Administration (FEA) which is authorized to order any public utility to convert its
primary energy source from gas or petroleum products to coal. Id., 2(a), 15 U.S.C. §
792(a) (Stipp. V 1975). A prerequisite to the effectiveness of such a conversion order,
however, is receipt by the FEA of notification from the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding the power plant's compliance with the ap-
plicable air pollution requirements. hi., § 2(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 792(b)(3)(B) (Supp. V
1975). Thus, the statute gives primary responsibility for the administration of the Act to
one agency, but mandates the participation of another in order to ensure that the par-
ticular concerns of the latter agency are factored into the former's decisionmaking pro-
cess.
222 See SEC REPoice ON PROPOSED LEcisiATION, supra note 219, at 18, where the
SEC comments "[Of the Administrator is concerned with administrative matters for the
bankruptcy system as a whole, there is no conflict if the SEC should continue to con-
cern itself with the investor protection aspects of a reorganization proceeding."
223
 31 Com:. Q. ALMANAC 456 (94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975).
2 " The Judges' Bill was first introduced in the 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., as H.R.
16643 and S. 4060. Subsequently, it was reintroduced in the 94th Cong., 1st Sess., as S.
235.
2" For a comparison of the major differences between the two bills, see generally
Lee, supra note 208. One critical distinction is that the Commission Bill would consoli-
date the present chapters X, Xl and XII into a simple reorganization Chapter VII,
whereas the Judges' Bill would combine Chapters XI and XII into a single chapter on
arrangements but otherwise would maintain the current distinction between reorganiza-
tions and arrangements. Id. at 38.
226
 31 Com:. Q. ALMANAC 456 (94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975). Both bills provide for
the establishment of independent United States bankruptcy courts. Lee, supra. note 208,
at 1,
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of Bankruptcy Administration. 227
 Through this Branch, the Director
of the Administrative Office would enjoy primary responsibility for
administrative matters such as the adoption of rules, the appointment
of trustees and creditors' committees, and the receipt and disburse-
ment of the funds of the debtor's estate. 228
 Thus, whereas the Com-
mission Bill proposes a delivery system controlled by an Administrator
exercising both administrative and judicial functions, the Judges' Bill
would continue the present "court-oriented" delivery system under
which the courts would merely delegate certain administrative
responsibilities. 229
Because the Judges' Bill retains the "court-oriented" delivery sys-
tem, the Director of the Administrative Office would not usurp the
SEC's current role. Instead, the Judges' Bill envisions the SEC's con-
tinued participation23° but effectuates certain important changes in
the provisions governing the advisory report and the service of docu-
ments. With respect to the service of documents, the Judges' Bill
eliminates the current requirement of section 265 231 which provides
for the service of copies of all pleadings and orders on the SEC. In-
stead, the proposed bill merely requires that the SEC receive
notices. 232
 The Commission has criticized the change as likely to in-
hibit its efforts to identify cases appropriate for its intervention. 233
 In
addition to changing the provision relating to service of documents,
the Judges' Bill institutes two changes relating to the SEC's role in the
confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Although it continues to
provide that the SEC may file advisory reports on plans with the
Court,234
 the bill eliminates the present requirement235 that the Court
must submit the proposed plan to the Commission for an advisory
report if the corporation's scheduled indebtedness exceeds
$3,000,000. 236
 Secondly, the Judges' Bill indicates that the SEC's ad-
visory report must be filed before, rather than after, the plan
2" Judges' Bill, Title II, §§ 206, 207. Lee, supra note 208, at 11-13.
22 " Judges' Bill, Title II, §§ 206, 207. Lee, supra note 208 at 11-13.
"9 Lee, supra note 208, at 13.
239
 The bill provides For the SEC's right to be heard on any matter arising in the
proceeding but omits the present language deeming the Commission to be "a party in
interest." Judges' Bill, § 2-205. In addition, the bill continues to provide that the SEC or
any party in interest may petition for the conversion of a case from the new Chapter
VIII on arrangements to a reorganization proceeding under the new Chapter VII.
Judges' Bill, § 8-201.
231
 Bankruptcy Act, § 265, 11 U.S.C. § 665 (1970).
332 J udges' Bill, § 4-701(c).
233 SEC REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION, supra note 219, at 16. In addition, re-
ceipt of copies of the pleadings and orders enables the SEC to fulfill an important ser-
vice for creditors and investors who can turn more conveniently to the Commission's
public reference rooms than to the files of the clerk of the court where the case is
pending. Id. Accordingly, the SEC recommends that the Judges' Bill, if enacted, should
be amended to provide that it should receive all documents filed in the case. Id. at 19.
235 Judges' Bill, § 7-305.
235
 Bankruptcy Act, § 172, 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970).
"a Judges' Bill, § 7-305.
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hearing. 237
 The SEC is strongly opposed to both these proposed
changes. 23° In particular, it contends that the time change for the fil-
ing of its advisory report is "critical" because a prehearing report
would not provide much assistance to public investors since it would
necessarily be limited to a textual analysis of a plan which is often re-
vised in the course of the hearing and would fail to take into account
the crucial evidence adduced at the hearing. 23 "
Whether the Judges's Bill might effectuate other changes in the
role of the SEC is somewhat unclear. The .proposed legislation clearly
envisions the SEC's continued participation insofar as it provides for
the SEC's right to be heard on any matter arising in the
proceeding. 240 However, this provision authorizing the SEC to appear
omits the language in the current Act"' which deems the Commission
a "party in interest. "242 Because many of its provisions are drawn in
terms of a "party in interest," 243
 this omission may suggest that the
Judges' Bill intends to limit the SEC to presenting its views in the
course of a motion made by another party rather than to petition on
its own in the first instance for similar relief. Thus, whereas in pro-
ceedings under the present Chapter X the SEC can file a formal ob-
jection to the appointment of a trustee, 244 the provisions of the
Judges' Bill may indicate that it cannot initiate such action but instead
is limited to presenting its views when the objection is raised by
another party. If, indeed, this is the result intended, the change is
probably motivated by the same sentiment which prompted the cur-
rent Act's denial to the SEC of the right to appeal: a government
agency should not. be allowed to delay the proceedings when none of
the parties with an economic interest in the proceeding have chosen
to do so. 245
 Just as the denial of the right to appeal has been criticized
as limiting the Commission's effectiveness, 246 the failure to accord it
status as a party in interest is equally likely to curtail its ability to pro-
tect public investors.
C. The Edwards Bill
The most recent proposed legislation seeking to revise the bank-
2" Id., * 7.305(b).
225 SEC REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGJSLATION, supra note 219, at 19. The Commis-
sion recommends retaining the provision for mandatory reference of plans to it for re-
port where the liabilities exceed $3,000,000. Id. It noted that it does nut comment on all
plans so referred and should be allowed to continue to exercise its discretion. Id.
"a Id.
24 ° See note 230 supra.
2" Bankruptcy Act, § 208, 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1970).
442 Judges' Bill, § 2-205.
243 E.g., § 7-101(c) (provision for change in membership of official creditors'
committee on application of party in interest when the committee is not representative
of members of the class); § 7-102 (appointment of trustee without regard to amount of
indebtedness).
2" See text supra at note 53.
245 See note 30 supra.
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ruptcy laws is that introduced by Congressman Edwards in the 95th
Congress. 247
 Like the Commission 1311 and the Judges' Bill, the Ed-
wards Bill provides for the creation of United States bankruptcy
courts.'" Furthermore, the Edwards Bill, like the Judges' Bill, envi-
sions the continuation of the present "court-oriented" delivery system.
The administrative component of the Edwards Bill, however, is even
more'limited in authority than the Branch of Bankruptcy Administra-
tion within the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
proposed by the Judges' Bill. The Edwards Bill creates an office of a
United States trustee, appointed in each district by the United States
Attorney Genera1,249
 who would operate under the general supervi-
sion of a Bankruptcy Divison to be created in the Department of
Justice. 2" The duties of this United States trustee, in general, would
be to "serve as and perform the duties of a trustee in a case under
title I 1 when required under title 11 to serve as trustee ...."251 Al-
though the bill confers certain additional specific authority upon the
United States trustee, 252
 the trustee would not exercise a general in-
dependent administrative authority which, for example, would au-
thorize him to adopt bankruptcy rules. 253
 Furthermore, he would not
serve as trustee in all cases arising under title I 1 because the bill ex-
pressly declines to denominate him as the exclusive person eligible for
such service.254
 Thus, the Edwards Bill, in creating the United States
trustee, does not thereby provide for the disinterested intervention of
246 Id.
247 Edwards Bill, supra note 202. The Edwards Bill is divided into four titles.
Title 1 amends the Bankruptcy Act and would be codified in 11 U.S.C. Tide II amends
28 U.S.C. and the federal rules of evidence. Title III amends the Internal Revenue
Code. Title IV includes amendments to other acts.
2" Id. Title I, § 151.
245 Id., Title III, § 581.
550 M., Title II, § 586(13).
22 ' Id., Title II, § 586(a)(1).
2 " The United States trustee, for example, may request that the court order the
appointment of a trustee or an independent investigator. Id., Title J. 1104. Similarly,
he may request that the court terminate the trustee's appointment and restore the
debtor to possession. Id., Title I, § 1105.
223 Compare provisions of the Judges' Bill governing the administrative authority
of the Branch of Bankruptcy Administration at note 228 supra.
464 Section 321 would allow a person to serve as trustee when he is-11) an indi-
vidual that is competent to perform the duties of trustee, and resides or has an office in
the judicial district within which the case . is pending; (2) a corporation authorized by
[its] charter or bylaws to act as trustee ... ; or (3) the United States trustee for such ju-
dicial district."
Significantly, there is no floor on the amount of a corporation's indebtedness
below which consideration of the appointment of a trustee is unwarranted. Id., Title I, §
1104. Instead, a court "may order the appointment of a trustee if--(1) the protection
afforded by a trustee is needed; and (2) the costs and expenses of a trustee would not
be disproportionately higher than the value of the protection afforded." Id. Compare,
for example, 7-102(a) of the Commission Bill which authorizes the administrator to
apply to the court to determine whether a trustee should be appointed when "the debt-
or is a corporation having debts of $1,000,000 or more and three hundred or more
security holders."
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a public agency on the same scale as would the Commission Bill and
the Judges' Bill in establishing, respectively, the Bankruptcy Adminis-
tration and Branch of Bankruptcy Administration within the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts.
The Edwards Bill, on the other hand, does contemplate an ex-
tensive role for the SEC, at least in connection with the procedures
leading to the confirmation of the plan of reorganization. The bill ex-
pressly provides for SEC participation at two crucial stages in the pro-
cess: the solicitation of acceptances to the plan and the hearing on its
confirmation. Thus, the SEC first may become involved in order to
monitor the adequacy of the disclosures made to creditors who are
being solicited to accept or reject the plan. Section 1125(b) provides
that "[a]it acceptance or rejection of a plan may not be solicited ...
from a holder of a claim or interest ... unless ... there is transmitted
to such holder the plan or a summary of the plan, and a written dis-
closure statement approved, after notice and a hearing, by the court
as containing adequate financial information about the debtor." 255
While the court, therefore, need not approve the plan itself before
the solicitation of acceptances, it must approve the written disclosure
statement and can only do so once it has held a hearing and deter-
mined that the statement meets the statutory disclosure standard. 256
Furthermore, the bill provides that the SEC may appear and be heard
at the hearing on the adequacy of the written disclosure statement. 257
262 Id ., Title 1, § 1125(b).
256 The bill defines "adequate financial information about the debtor" to mean:
information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably prac-
ticable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of
the debtor's books and records, as would enable a hypothetical reasonable
investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant class to
make an informed judgment about the plan ... ." Id., § 1125(a)(1).
152 Section 1125(d) provides that
[s]olicitation ... is not governed by any otherwise applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law, rule or regulation, but an agency or official whose duty is to
administer or enforce such law, rule or regulation may be heard on the
issue of whether a disclosure statement contains adequate financial infor-
mation about the debtor. Such an agency or official may not appeal from
an order approving a disclosure statement.
Since the proposed provision is conditioned on a finding that the SEC, or other
agency, is subject to the duty of administering or enforcing a law or regulation which
otherwise would be applicable to the solicitation, there might be situations in which the
SEC could not participate because the federal securities laws and rules and regulations
issued thereunder would not otherwise be applicable to the proxy solicitation of accep-
tances or rejections of the plan of reorganization. For example, under the current Act,
the proxy req uirements or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 do not apply to solicita-
tions of a Chapter X plan because a limited exemption has been provided in recogni-
tion of the fact that the Chapter X provision for transmitting the SEC's own report and
recommendations largely negate the necessity of complying with the statutory proxy re-
quirements. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, R. 14a-2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(e)
(1974). These same proxy requirements do apply, however, to the solicitation of con-
sents in a Chapter XI case. See Corotto, supra note 72, at 1581, As the present exemp-
tion which applies to solicitations of a Chapter X plan is conditioned on the adequacy of
the disclosure already provided by the Bankruptcy Act, it would scent that the Edwards'
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In addition to authorizing the SEC to appear in order to ensure the
adequacy of the disclosure statement, the Edwards Bill also entitles it
to appear at the hearing on the plan and to object to its
confirmation. 258
 Because the bill enumerates a wide range of re-
quirements which the plan must meet to entitle it to judicial confirma-
tion, the provision allowing the SEC to object to its confirmation ef-
fectively gives it leeway to express its view on a considerable number
of issues arising in the course of the reorganization proceedings. 258
While the Edwards Bill permits a two-step appearance by the
SEC in conjunction with the plan of reorganization and thereby
guarantees more effective protection of the interests of public inves-
tors, it does not expressly permit the SEC to continue to appear and
be heard in connection with the variety of issues arising in the course
of the administration of the debtor's estate. Unlike the Judges' Bill
and the Commission Bill, the Edwards Bill does not contain any gen-
eral grant of standing to the SEC. 26 ° The bill's failure to provide for
standing unnecessarily would hinder the SEC in its ability to
safeguard the interests of public investors. The rote of the United
States trustee envisioned by the bill is not necessarily so extensive as to
render the SEC's performance of its advisory role merely duplicative.
Nor can the provisions for its appearance, however extensive, in con-
nection with the acceptance and confirmation of the plan obviate the
necessity for impartial representation during the earlier administra-
tion of the debtor's estate. On the contrary, the SEC, for example,
views its current role with respect to those administrative matters as
serving to prevent the confirmation of the plan from becoming little
more than a ratification of a fait accompli. 26 ' If the bill proponents,
however, are concerned that SEC intervention in these earlier stages
of a corporate reorganization operates to add unnecessary expense
and delay to the proceedings, a possible compromise is suggested by
the Judges' Bill which apparently would allow the SEC to present its
views only in the course of an objection raised by another party in in-
Bill would not intend both to declare that the proxy requirements of the federal se-
curities laws did not govern the solicitation of acceptances and also to use that same
declaration of inapplicability as a basis for denying the SEC's right to appear in order to
ensure compliance with the standards imposed by the bill itself. A full discussion of the
exemption from federal securities laws established in these proposed bills is beyond the
scope of this article. For an analysis of the exemption provisions of the Judges' Bill and
the Commission Bill, see SEC REPORT ON PROPOSED LEGISI.A"FION, supra note 219, at
101-112.
25H
	 Bill, .supra note 202, Title I, § 1 128(h).
2"Id., § 1129. The requirements include, for example, the necessity of finding
that payment of allowances made before the confirmation of the plan were reasonable.
Id., § 1129(a)(4),
2511 A conversation the author had with congressional staff counsel on March 22,
1976 suggests that the Edwards Bill, in fact, may be revised to grant the Commission
standing.
all See, in particular, its position on the sale of all or a substantial part of the
debtor's assets when the sale is not made pursuant to a plan of reorganization, as dis-
cussed in the text supra at notes 90-99.
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terest and not to petition on its own in the first instance for similar re-
lief. Although this restriction may limit the SEC's effectiveness, to
some extent it would continue to afford the participants, and the
court, the benefit of the expertise acquired by the SEC in nearly forty
years of such appearances.
CONCLUSION
Because corporate reorganizations and arrangements present
what is fundamentally an administrative problem in corporate finance
and management, the SEC has assumed a major role under Chapter
X and Chapter Xl of the Bankruptcy Act. The Commission's function
resembles that of an amicus curiae which monitors the performance
and qualification of other parties in interest, acts as an impartial rep-
resentative of public investors and provides expert assistance to the
court. The general consensus is that:
the service being rendered by the Commission to the
Courts in connection with the reorganization of corpora-
tions [is] most valuable, if not indispensable, for the proper
disposition of this vital segment of court business according
to the Congressional intent. The Commission affords the
necessary expert knowledge, the skill, and the uniform ap-
proach which individual justices cannot have; ... the assis-
tance is unique in its usefulness, and not otherwise to be
obtained. The judge is not bound to obser'e all suggestions
of the Commission, but the very fact that he has them be-
fore him is assurance of his complete preparation for ad-
judication, with the public interest adequately protected. 262
In light of the extent to which the SEC's participation has been
welcomed by the federal judiciary, the alterations in its role en-
visioned by proposed legislation aimed at revising the Bankruptcy Act
warrant careful scrutiny. Rather than lose the benefit. of the substan-
tial expertise acquired by the SEC, such legislation should seek to se-
cure the SEC's continued participation in corporate reorganization
proceedings. Therefore, in order to ensure the SEC's ability to con-
tinue to concern itself with the investor protection aspects of these
proceedings, the proposed amendments should accord the SEC stand-
ing to intervene and also should institutionalize its participation in
conjunction with the confirmation of the plan.
2" 2 21 SEC ANN. REP. 89 (1955), quoting- a comment received from Chief Judge
Charles E. Clark, written on behalf of all the judges of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The Commission had sought comments from the federal judiciary in connection
with a reappraisal of its functions in corporate reorganization proceedings.
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